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Abstract 
In a correlated equilibrium, the players’ choice of actions is directed by correlated random 
messages received from an outside source, or mechanism. These messages allow for more 
equilibrium outcomes than without any messages (pure-strategy equilibrium) or with 
statistically independent ones (mixed-strategy equilibrium). In an incomplete information game, 
the messages may also reflect the types of the players, either because they are affected by 
extraneous factors that also affect the types (correlated equilibrium) or because the players 
themselves report their types to the mechanism (communication equilibrium). Mechanisms may 
be further differentiated by the connections between the messages that the players receive and 
their own and the other players’ types, by whether the messages are statistically dependent or 
independent, and by whether they are random or deterministic. Consequently, whereas for 
complete information games there are only three classes of equilibrium outcomes, with 
incomplete information the corresponding number is 14 or 15 for correlated equilibria and even 
larger – 15, 16 or 17 – for communication equilibria. For both solution concepts, the implication 
relations between the different kinds of equilibria form a two-dimensional lattice, which is 
considerably more intricate than the single-dimensional one of the complete information case. 
JEL Classification: C72. 
Keywords: Correlated equilibrium; Communication equilibrium; Incomplete information; 
Bayesian games; Mechanism; Implementation  
1  Introduction 
In complete information games, pure-strategy equilibria represent only a subset of the 
outcomes achievable by mixed-strategy equilibria, which in turn allow for fewer equilibrium 
outcomes than correlated equilibria. This is so whether ‘outcome’ is interpreted as referring to 
the distribution of the players’ action profile or to their expected payoffs. Implementing the 
three solution concepts requires different, increasingly more general, mechanisms. Pure-
strategy equilibria can do without any mechanism at all, but mixed-strategy equilibria require 
independent randomizations and correlated equilibria require centralized randomization. A 
similar connection between the allowed kinds of mechanisms and the implementable outcomes 
holds for incomplete information, or Bayesian, games, but it is considerably more complex than 
in the complete information case. This is because the set of equilibrium outcomes 
implementable by a mechanism may depend on the manner and the extent to which its output 
reflects the players’ types. It may matter, for example, whether the messages that the players 
receive from the mechanism provide them with information about the other players’ types, and 
whether they depend on the receiver’s own type. The former may affect the mechanism’s ability 
to implement type-dependent coordinated actions, and the latter reflects its ability to transmit 
information selectively, that is, to certain types of players only.  
Dependence of the message received by a player on his own type does not logically require a 
type-aware mechanism. Type-dependent perceptual abilities may suffice. For example, the 
information about the value of an auctioned asset that a firm is able to extract from publicly 
presented data may depend on its level of experience or financial resources. By contrast, the 
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received message may provide information about the other players’ types only if the mechanism 
“knows” something about them. This may be so if the message is affected by factors that also 
affect the types. For example, firms entering an auction may factor in certain macroeconomic 
indicators when deciding on their bids, because, among other things, the state of the economy 
as a whole may bear on their competitors’ situation. Similarly, the asking price of a farmer, 
hunter or trawler dealing with a wholesaler may be influenced by the recent weather or sea 
condition, because the latter is correlated with the market supply.  
An alternative, straightforward way to construct a type-aware mechanism is through self-
reporting of types. The reporting may be explicit or implicit. The former may hold, for example, 
for a mechanism that takes the form of an impartial mediator, and the latter holds for direct 
exchange of messages between players.  
The two different kinds of type-aware mechanism correspond to two distinct solution concepts 
for incomplete information games: correlated equilibrium and communication equilibrium. The 
former employs one-way communication only – messages from the mechanism to the players – 
whereas the latter also involves (explicit or implicit) type reports from the players. In both cases, 
the messages that the mechanism sends to the players are not necessarily concrete action 
recommendations. The translation into actions is described by the players’ strategies, which, for 
each player type, associate an action with each possible message. In a correlated equilibrium, 
taking the associated action is required to be incentive compatible. Communication equilibrium 
adds the requirement that truthful type reports are incentive compatible: players never have an 
incentive to misrepresent their types.  
Correlated and communication equilibria, as defined here, share a single notion of correlated 
strategy, which is a pair consisting of a mechanism and a strategy profile. Where they differ is in 
the interpretation of the type profile on which the mechanism’s messages are based: true vs. 
reported types.
1 Other solutions concepts, such as Bayesian equilibrium, may be viewed as 
special cases, obtained by limiting in one or more ways the mechanism’s capabilities. Depending 
on the context, the potency of these limitations may stem from their influence on the 
mechanisms’ ability to orchestrate certain joint actions, to make the actions incentive 
incompatible, or to elicit truthful type reports. The main objective of this paper is to present a 
taxonomy of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes that is based on the 
properties of the mechanisms capable of implementing them. The questions this goal raises are 
quite different – both in substance and in the relevant techniques – from those arising in the 
context of complete information games. They have some formal similarity, which is reflected in 
the similar terminology, to the question of implementability of social choice functions studied in 
mechanism design theory. However, the subject matter here is not a special case of the latter 
(see also Kar et al., 2010).  
The “plan of attack” of the present work is to separate the question of the implementability of 
correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes into three interrelated questions. The first 
question is the implementability of correlated strategy distributions, where only the joint 
distribution of the players’ types and actions matters and payoffs are irrelevant. The second 
question, which does take payoffs and incentive compatibility into account, is the 
implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium distributions. The third, and 
arguably most important, question is the implementability of payoff vectors. The players’ 
(expected) payoffs are uniquely determined by the joint distribution of types and actions but 
not conversely. The advantages of this three-part approach, when compared with directly 
addressing the third problem, are that it makes certain issues significantly more manageable 
and provides insights about the roots of non-implementability where the latter occurs.  
The framework laid out in this paper accommodates the majority of the previously described 
varieties of correlated strategies, correlated equilibria and communication equilibria in 
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incomplete information games, and adds a good number of new ones. Different kinds of 
equilibria may be related in that one is a special case of another. As this paper shows, these 
relations form a rich and intricate structure, and they are not always obvious or perfectly 
intuitive. This is quite different from the complete information case, where the three kinds of 
equilibria are simply linearly ordered.   
The next section illustrates the various issues involved in this work by means of examples. 
Section ‎ 3 describes the connections with the existing literature on incomplete information 
games. Section ‎ 4 lays out the formal framework. The three subsequent sections present results, 
primarily in the form of three Hasse diagrams that show the relations between the different 
kinds of correlated strategy outcomes (Section ‎ 5), correlated equilibrium outcomes (Section ‎ 6) 
and communication equilibrium outcomes (Section ‎ 7). Section ‎ 8 synthesizes and extends these 
results, and in particular uses them as the basis for the classification of the possible outcomes 
according to the properties of the implementing mechanisms. The paper’s four appendices 
include the majority of the proofs and several additional examples.  
2  Illustrative Examples 
The following four examples illustrate some of the questions studied in this paper and the 
framework used for tackling them. In addition, each example points to a specific non-obvious 
way in which the properties of a mechanism affect the correlated strategies, correlated 
equilibria or communication equilibria implementable by it.  
Example 1   
Consider the following simple       Bayesian game (Milchtaich, 2004, Example 6). The two 
players have identical two-element action spaces,           {   }, and identical two-element 
type spaces,           {     }. The four type profiles are equally probable, so that types are 
independent. (Independence is not a crucial assumption. It would suffice to assume that all type 
profiles have positive probability.) A correlated strategy distribution is defined as follows: (i) If 
both players have type   , the action profile is either       or      , each with probability    , 
and (ii) if the type profile is any of the other three, the action profile is either       or      , 
each with probability    . 
Since in the above distribution the players’ actions are correlated but their types are not, 
implementation requires an extraneous correlation mechanism. For example, the players may 
use as cues for their choice of actions certain signals, or messages, that they receive from the 
same outside source or different sources. The message that each player receives may 
conceivably depend on his type (e.g., because of type-specific perceptual abilities; see the 
Introduction), but it may be affected by the other player’s type only if the sending source is 
somehow aware of the latter. It may seem doubtful that such effect is necessary. This is because 
the above distribution has the so-called conditional independence property (see Section ‎ 5.1): 
the action of a player of a given type is statistically independent of the other player’s type. 
Indeed, the probability that the action is   or   is always    , regardless of both players’ types. It 
turns out, however, that even though each player’s action does not reflect the other player’s 
type, the latter must have an effect on the cue used for selecting the action. The distribution 
specified above cannot be implemented by any mechanism where a player’s type has no effect 
whatsoever on the message received by the other player. (In other words, this is not a type 
correlated distribution; see Section ‎ 4.3.) 
The last assertion can be proved as follows. Consider any mechanism that sends to the players 
messages that are affected only by their own types. These messages may be random, and so are 
described by four, possibly statistically dependent, random variables   
 ,   
 ,   
  and   
 , 
where the subscript identifies the player and the superscript identifies his type. Each possible 
realization    
    
    
    
   of these random variables determines a quartet of actions 
   
    
    
    
   according to the players’ strategies, which specify the way each player uses the 
message he receives as a cue for choosing his action. (For example,   
  is the action that the 
message   
  prompts player 1 to choose when his type is   .) For the quartet to be consistent 
with the specified distributions, it must satisfy   
      
 ,   
      
 ,   
      
  and   
      
 . 4 
However, since there are only two possible actions, the equality and the three inequalities are 
contradictory. The contradiction proves the above assertion.  
A simple mechanism capable of implementing the above distribution is one that, for each type 
profile, simply randomizes between the two possible action profiles and tells each player his 
action. The mechanism must be aware the players’ types, since they determine the allowed 
action pairs. Nevertheless, as indicated, no information about the types is revealed by the action 
of any single player, even if his own type his known. 
Example 2   
The message that a mechanism sends to a player may reflect not only the other players’ types 
but also the player’s own type. The latter is an expression of the selectivity of the message, in 
particular, differences between player types in the information they get about the other players. 
As the following example demonstrates, selectivity may be necessary for making certain choices 
of actions incentive compatible.  
Consider a symmetric       Bayesian game with the same game structure and distribution of 
type profiles as in Example 1, and where the two players always get equal payoffs, which for a 
type profile         are given by the payoff matrix 
            
 
 
(
       
       
)   
Thus, depending on the type profile,   or   is a dominant action for both players. A mechanism 
sends to each player a message, which is a type profile. For type    of player 1 and for both 
types of player 2, the type profile is the real one        . For type    of player 1, the message is 
always        . This mechanism and the pair of strategies that simply instruct each player to 
choose the dominant action for the type profile that is specified by the message he receives 
together constitute a correlated equilibrium, which has the following distribution: if the type 
profile is        ,        ,         or         (each possibility has probability    ), the 
action profile is      ,      ,       or      , respectively. The expected payoffs of type    of 
player 1 and types    and    of player 2 are    ,   and    , respectively, and these playoffs 
are clearly the highest these player types could achieve by choosing any actions. The same is 
true for type    of player 1, whose expected payoff would decrease from   to     if he 
switched from his (constant) action   to  .  
The mechanism described above sends information about player 2 only to type    of player 1. 
Such a differential treatment of 1’s types is necessary. The above correlated equilibrium 
distribution is not implementable by any mechanism where for each type of player 2 the 
message that player 1 receives is statistically independent of his own type. To see this, suppose 
that such a mechanism exists, and let   
  and   
  be some specific messages that player 1 
receives with positive probability (which is the same for both types of that player) when player 
2’s type is    and   , respectively. The two messages cannot be identical, for otherwise type 
   of player 1 would not always be able to tell 2’s type, which is inconsistent with the fact that 
(according to the above distribution) with probability   he plays   if the type is    and   if it is 
  . Therefore, every such   
  and   
  must be distinct, which entails that player 1 can always 
tell by his message the type, and hence the action, of player 2. However, this is inconsistent with 
incentive compatibility, since it implies that, by always choosing the same action as player 2, 
type    of player 1 could increase his payoff from   to    . This contradiction proves that a 
mechanism that implements the above correlated equilibrium distribution cannot have the 
property that (if the type of player 2 is known) the message to player 1 never reveals any 
information about his own type. 
Example 3   
A non-obvious, yet important distinction exists between the requirement that the message to a 
particular player does not reveal any information about the type of that player (as in the case 
considered in the last paragraph) or about another player’s type and the stronger requirement 
that the message is not affected by that type (which is the property considered in Example 1). 
The significance of this distinction is illustrated by the following example (see also Section ‎ 4.2).  5 
  Player 2 
      Type         Type      
Player 1 
                     
Type        0.75  0  0.75     0.25  0.25  0.5 
   0  0.25  0.25     0.5  0  0.5 
    0.75  0.25      0.75  0.25   
                     
Type        0.25  0.5  0.75     0  0. 5  0.5 
   0.25  0  0.25     0.5  0  0.5 
    0.5  0.5      0.5  0.5   
Table 1. A correlated equilibrium distribution for Example 3. The four type profiles are equally probable. For each 
of them, the joint distribution of the players’ actions (each of which can be   or  ), as well as the marginal 
distributions, are shown.  
The game is the same as in Example 2. A correlated equilibrium distribution in this game is given 
by Table 1, which specifies the (conditional) distribution of the players’ action profile for each 
type profile. The marginal distributions, i.e., the probability that a player of a given type plays   
or  , depend only on the opponent’s type. Specifically, if the latter is    or   ,   has 
probability 0.75 or 0.5, respectively. Therefore, a mechanism that randomly chooses an action 
profile         according to the probabilities that the table specifies for the players’ actual type 
profile, and reports    to player 1 and    to player 2, has the property that the message to a 
player reveals no information about his own type. This mechanism and the strategies of acting 
according to the messages it sends together constitute a correlated equilibrium, as it is not 
difficult to check that a player can never increase his expected payoff by deviating to the other 
action. It is also true, but less easy to check, that the correlated equilibrium distribution in Table 
1 is not implementable by any mechanism with the stronger property that the message sent to 
each player is unaffected by the player’s type. In fact, it takes a computer to check this. 
Although the problem is a standard linear programming one – it needs to be checked that a 
particular system of linear equalities and inequalities does not have a solution – the number of 
variables and equalities/inequalities involved (at least 256 and 20, respectively) is far too great 
for manual calculations. 
Some intuition about why a mechanism as above cannot implement the correlated equilibrium 
distribution in Table 1 can be gained by considering two conceivable mechanisms where a 
player’s type does not affect the message he receives. The first mechanism randomly selects 
four actions,   
    
    
  and   
 , according to some suitable joint distribution, and then, 
depending on whether the type of player   (     ) is    or   , instructs the other player   to 
take the action   
  and   
 , respectively. However, such a mechanism cannot yield the 
distribution in Table 1. The reason is similar to that in Example 1, and in particular, it does not 
involve incentives (i.e., payoffs).  
The second conceivable implementing mechanism for the distribution in Table 1 sends as a 
message to each player not a single action but a pure strategy, which is a specification of action 
for each of the player’s types. It leaves it to the player to choose the action corresponding to his 
actual type. Specifically, the mechanism first chooses action profiles according to the 
probabilities specified by Table 1, independently for each of the four type profiles. Then, based 
on the players’ actual type profile        , it tells player 1 both his action for the type profile 
        and his action for        , and similarly for player 2 (so that each player’s own type 
does not affect the message he receives). If the players use the messages in the intended 
manner, that is, they take the first or second action if their type is    or   , respectively, then 
the action distributions for the four type profiles are indeed as in Table 1. However, this is not a 
correlated equilibrium. The reason is that the double message conveys too much information 
about the other player’s type. By assumption, the prior probability that player 2 has type    is 
   . By Bayes’ rule, the posterior probability that 2 has that type given that player 1 plays   is 
(                   )    . Thus, telling player 1 which action he should take gives him some 
information about 2’s type, but not too much information, in the sense that taking the action is 
still optimal for him. A double message as above amounts to two independent draws from the 
same unknown distribution, which provide more information about the underlying distribution 
than a single draw. For example, telling player 1 that he should play   whether his type is    or 6 
   increases the (posterior) probability that 2’s type is    to almost    . This probability is 
greater than    , which means that, regardless of the actions that the two types of play 2 take, 
  is not the optimal action for type    of player 1. Thus, a player may deduce from the 
additional information conveyed by the double message he receives that his expected payoff 
from taking the action he is supposed to take is actually less than for the alternative action.   
Example 4   
The following example, which is taken from Gerardi (2004, Example 2), illustrates the difference 
between implementability of correlated equilibrium distribution and of communication 
equilibrium distribution. By definition, in a communication equilibrium, the players report their 
types to the mechanism and truth telling is incentive compatible. The example shows that to 
satisfy this requirement, any implementing mechanism must use randomization. Thus, 
randomization has a different role than in Examples 1 and 3, where it is required simply because 
for some type profiles the player’s actions are not unique. Here (as in Example 2), a single action 
profile is assigned to each type profile. However, without randomization, incentive compatibility 
cannot be upheld. 
In a three-player Bayesian game, player 1 has two types,   
  and   
 , player 2 has two types,   
  
and   
 , and player 3 has a single type. Types   
  and   
  cannot occur together, but the other 
three type profiles are all possible and equally probable. Players 1 and 2 have a single action, 
and player 3 has four actions,   
    
    
  and   
 . The four payoff vectors corresponding to these 
actions, for each type profile, are given by the following table: 
    
                                                                  
 
  
 
  
 
                                                                     
                                     
  
According to the table, for each of the three possible type profiles, player 3 receives his 
maximum payoff of   only by choosing one or two particular actions, and the former holds only 
for    
    
   (for which the unique optimal action is   
 ). Thus, there are four different ways to 
choose optimal actions for each type profile. Each such choice of actions specifies a correlated 
strategy distribution, which is implementable by a mechanism that simply tells player 3 the 
types of the other players. However, it can be shown that only one of these four is also a 
communication equilibrium distribution, namely, the one in which player 3 chooses action   
  if 
the other players’ types are either    
    
   or    
    
  . In addition, in any communication 
equilibrium, player 3 randomizes exactly fifty-fifty between   
  and   
  if the impossible type 
combination    
    
   is reported, for otherwise truthful type reports would not be incentive 
compatible for player 1 or 2. It follows that any mechanism that implements the above 
communication equilibrium distribution necessarily involves randomization.  
3  Related Literature 
As Aumann (1987) showed, a correlated equilibrium may be viewed as an expression of 
Bayesian rationality. A rational player’s choice of action is optimal given his knowledge of the 
state of the world. The latter includes a specification of the knowledge of the other players as 
well as their actions, which must also be optimal. Aumann’s paper is concerned only with 
complete information games; types of players and type-dependent payoffs are not part of the 
setting. However, since the state-space formulation is a standard model for Bayesian games, the 
paper indicated the logical next step, which was to merge the two settings by allowing the states 
of the world to determine not only the players’ types but also any additional information that 
they possess and may use for choosing their actions. Crucially, that additional information is not 
specified by the game – it is part of the solution concept. Herein lies the major difference 
between correlated equilibrium and the narrower concept of Bayesian equilibrium. In the latter, 
players have to do with the information that they receive within the game, and possibly private 
coin tosses. 7 
Two models of the kind outlined above were proposed by Cotter (1991, 1994). They differ from 
one another in the restrictions they put on the players’ additional information. In a strategy 
correlated equilibrium (Cotter, 1991), the additional information takes the form of random 
messages that the players receive from an outside correlation mechanism, which is ignorant of 
their types. A correlated strategy with such a mechanism is a prescription of a (pure or 
randomized) action for each type of each player, which depends on the message he receives. 
The equilibrium condition is that taking the prescribed action is incentive compatible in that no 
player can increase his expected payoff by taking a different action. A type correlated 
equilibrium (Cotter, 1994; see also Samuelson and Zhang, 1989) can be described as a strategy 
correlated equilibrium in a version of the game in which each type of each player is an 
independent agent, so that the message a player receives may depend on his type. However, as 
in a strategy correlated equilibrium, the message is unaffected by the other players’ types. 
Consequently, the player’s action is necessarily conditionally independent of the other players’ 
types, given the player’s own type. Cotter asserted that this conditional independence property 
is characteristic of type correlated equilibria, in that any correlated equilibrium distribution that 
has it can be implemented by a mechanism as above. However, Example 1 shows that this 
assertion is incorrect (see also Section ‎ 5.1).  
A different extension of correlated equilibrium to games with incomplete information is 
communication (or mediated) equilibrium (Myerson, 1994). This solution concept is 
characterized by bidirectional communication. The players first send private messages to, and 
then receive such messages from, a particular mechanism, which thus serves as a mediator as 
well as a correlation device. According to the revelation principle (see Myerson, 1994), without 
loss of generality the messages sent by the players to the mediator may be assumed type 
reports. The message that each player gets from the mediator indicates a particular action for 
that player. The mechanism is required to be incentive compatible in that it is in each player’s 
best interest to report his type honestly and take the indicated action if all the others do the 
same.  
A comprehensive account of correlated and communication equilibria in games with incomplete 
information is Forges’ (1993) paper, which compares strategy correlated equilibrium, type (or 
agent normal form) correlated equilibrium, communication equilibrium, and ‘Bayesian solution’. 
(A fifth solution concept considered in the paper concerns hierarchies of beliefs.) Bayesian 
solution is a very general solution concept, which fully realizes the extension of Aumann’s 
notion of Bayesian rationality to incomplete information games. It includes strategy and type 
correlated equilibria as special cases. A Bayesian solution extends a given incomplete 
information game by introducing a state space where several states may correspond to a single 
type profile. This allows players to have partial or complete information about the other players’ 
types as well as about outside events. As in Aumann’s (1987) model, the information structure is 
complemented by a mapping from states to action profiles that is required to satisfy the obvious 
incentive compatibility condition. A Bayesian solution may be implemented by an omniscient 
mediator, who knows the players’ types. Thus, unlike in a communication equilibrium, only one-
way communication is required.
2  
As indicated, the messages that the players receive from the mediator are part of the solution 
concept and are thus distinct from any signals they receive as part of the game itself, which are 
completely specified by their types. However, the potential impact of the former (the mediator’s 
messages) may depend on the degree of dependence among the latter (the players’ types). For 
example, with perfectly correlated types, the players effectively already know each other’s type 
when they receive the mediator’s messages, which can therefore only help them to coordinate 
their actions. Conversely, if the types are independent, the mediator’s messages may also 
inform players about the other players’ types. However, this may be so only if the solution 
concept allows the messages to depend on the other players’ types. Therefore, depending on 
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general as it could be, in that the mediator knows only the players’ types, and not any other payoff-
relevant information that is not extractable from the type profile. They call the generalization that allows 
the mediator to possess and use such information Bayes correlated equilibrium. 8 
the solution concept, garbling, or randomly perturbing, in a particular way the signals that the 
players receive as part of the game may or may not change the set of equilibrium outcomes.
3 
Lehrer et al. (2006) identified the kinds of garbling that do not affect the equilibrium outcomes 
for three kinds of correlated equilibrium in two-player Bayesian games: mixed-strategy 
equilibrium, type correlated equilibrium, and a special kind of Bayesian solution (called belief 
invariant Bayesian solution by Forges, 2006), which satisfies a condition similar to the 
conditional independence property. They showed, for example, that garbing has no effect on 
mixed-strategy equilibria (regardless of the payoff functions) if and only if it is performed 
independently for each player, that is, without taking into account the other player’s signal.   
Identification of information types (Milchtaich, 2004) is a special kind of garbling. It removes 
distinctions between player types that are interchangeable in terms of their effect on the 
player’s own payoff and on those of the others and differ, say, only in what the player knows 
about the other players’ types. Identification of information types may transform one kind of 
equilibrium into another. For example, a pure-strategy equilibrium (with different actions for 
different information types) may become a mixed-strategy equilibrium (with several possible 
actions for the single type that results from the identification). Therefore, the collection of pure-
strategy equilibria is not closed under identification of information types. The same is true for 
certain more general solution concepts. For example, this is so for type correlated equilibrium, 
since when information types are identified, the conditional independence property may cease 
to hold (Milchtaich, 2004, Examples 7). In fact (see Milchtaich, 2004, Propositions 4 and 5), the 
narrowest extension of pure-strategy equilibrium that is closed under identification of 
information types is the notion of correlated equilibrium used in the present work, which is 
similar to Forges’ (1993, 2006) Bayesian solution, or global equilibrium in the terminology of 
Lehrer et al. (2006). Thus, in this respect at least, this solution concept is not excessively broad.  
4  Preliminaries 
4.1  Bayesian games 
An  -player (finite) pre-Bayesian game is a function                            , where 
                    and                     are each the Cartesian product of   finite 
sets and   is the real line.     {       } is the set of players. For each player  , the sets    and 
   and the function    are respectively the type space, action space and payoff function of 
player  . For each type profile                      and action profile                     , 
       is the resulting  -tuple of payoffs.  
One interpretation of player types is that they represent signals that players receive about the 
“state of nature” (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994). The latter may conceivably have a direct 
effect on the players’ payoffs, which is apparently not the case in the above “reduced” 
formulation, where the payoffs are completely determined by the type and action profiles. 
However, the general case can be formulated simply by adding nature as a (dummy) player, 
whose type space consists of all states of nature. A state may represent complete resolution of 
all uncertainty in the game, and in particular determine the (real) players’ types. Alternatively, a 
state may represent only certain “hidden variables” that affect the players’ payoffs but cannot 
be extracted from the type profile. Nature does not take action, and so the corresponding action 
space is necessarily a singleton and the payoff function is irrelevant.  
A pure strategy for a player   is a function from the player’s type space to his action space, i.e., 
an element of   
  . Using some fixed indexing of the (finite) type space,      {  
    
   }, any 
pure-strategy can be written as    
    
    , where, for each  ,   
  is the action of the  th type of 
player  . A pure-strategy profile is an assignment of a pure strategy to each player, i.e., an 
element of   
       
          
  . It can be written as    
    
      
    
        
    
     .  
                                                            
3 This assumes that the players’ types only represent information and do not have a direct effect on 
payoffs.  9 
A pre-Bayesian game becomes a (finite) Bayesian game when it is coupled with a specified 
probability measure on  , the players’ common prior   . The collection of all type profiles to 
which the common prior assigns positive probability, i.e., its support         , may be a proper 
subset of  . However, it is assumed (essentially without loss of generality) that every type    of 
every player   is supported, in the sense that                     for some partial type profile 
                           . It is useful to view the common prior as the distribution of some 
random variable with values in  ,
4 the random type profile                 .
5 Thus, 
   { }                      
For each player  , the conditional distribution of  , given   , may be interpreted as the player’s 
posterior beliefs about the type profile after he learns his own type.  
4.2  Mechanisms 
A mechanism for an  -player Bayesian game is an extraneous source of messages
6, which the 
players receive before they choose their actions. The message    that each player   receives is 
an element of some finite set   , the player’s (received) message space. It may reflect to a 
lesser or greater extent the players’ type profile. As indicated, one of these players may be 
nature, and in this case, the messages may provide the real players with payoff-relevant 
information that would not otherwise be available to them even through information pooling. 
Formally, a mechanism is a random variable   that is (statistically) independent of the random 
type profile  , with values that are functions from   to the product set                    . 
Evaluation at (in other words, projection on) any type profile       gives the corresponding 
random message profile                               , which describes the messages 
that the players receive when their types are  . Since the type profile is itself random, the actual 
messages are given by the random variable     , whose value is the message profile obtained 
by evaluating the function returned by   at the type profile returned by  . Note that the 
assumption that   and   are (statistically) independent, which expresses the extraneous nature 
of the messages (see Section ‎ 4.2.1 for further discussion of this point), does not contradict the 
assertion that the latter may reflect the type profile. To take an extreme example, if the 
mechanism is an outside observer who is capable of finding out the players’ types, his message 
to each player   may fully convey that information:  
                  
In this example, independence holds simply because the mechanism does not perform any 
randomization, and thus serves purely as a source of information about the other players’ types. 
Other mechanisms may partially or exclusively serve as randomization devices, and convey little 
or no information about the types. A finer, more exact classification of mechanisms is facilitated 
by the following list of possible properties, which are referred to in this paper as the 
fundamental properties of mechanisms. Each property is expressed by a condition that the 
message that each player   receives from the mechanism is required to satisfy for every pair of 
type profiles              and         
     
   .  
( )  The message is unaffected by the receiving player’s type:  
             
        
                                                            
4 A random variable, in this work, is any function from a finite probability space where each point has 
positive probability to a finite set. Enumerating the range would in principle enable viewing the random 
variable as real- or integer-valued, but doing so has little practical value. Random variables are denoted by 
boldface letters and, following common practice, their arguments are always suppressed.  
5 One way to obtain a random type profile is by restricting the common prior to its support and defining   
as the identity map on         . However, since only the distribution of the random type profile is 
specified, there is actually more than one version of it. Any reference to the random type profile is taken 
to mean that differences between versions are irrelevant, which entails that the reference is ultimately to 
the common prior itself.  
6 The term ‘messages’, rather than ‘signals’, is used here to emphasize the assumption that the sending 
mechanism is part of a solution concept rather than the game. As indicated, ‘signals’ in an incomplete 
information game are often synonymous with the players’ types, which are part of the game.  
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(  ̃)  The message provides no information about the receiving player’s type: 
       
 
     
       
7 
( )  The message is unaffected by the other players’ types:  
                 
     
(  ̃)  The message provides no information about the other players’ types: 
       
 
         
     
( )  The message is non-random:  
      has a degenerate distribution 8 
( )  The message is (statistically) independent of the messages that the other players 
receive:  
                    are independent. 
The equality between random variables required by properties   and   means equality with 
probability   (equivalently, pointwise equality). Conditions   ̃ and   ̃, by contrast, only require 
equality between the distributions of two random variables, for specified type profiles. Since the 
players’ types are actually random, the latter translates into equality between conditional 
distributions. Specifically,   ̃ entails that the message that player   receives is conditionally 
independent of his type   , given the other players’ types    . In property   ̃,    and     are 
interchanged.  
As this work shows, the distinction between equality with probability   and equality in 
distribution has significant implications for correlated strategies and equilibria.
9 Nevertheless, it 
does not seem to have received sufficient attention in the existing literature on games with 
incomplete information. Indeed, properties   and   cannot even be stated using the formalism 
employed, e.g., by Myerson (1994). That formalism specifies the distribution of the random 
message profile separately for each type profile, and thus provides no language for describing 
connections between the messages corresponding to different type profiles.  
The list of properties of mechanisms is potentially extendable beyond the fundamental 
properties. Two conceivable additions are the “duals” of   and   ̃, which assert that the type of 
a player does not affect the other players’ messages or (at least) is not reflected in their joint 
distribution. These additions may be particularly meaningful if the player in question is nature 
(see Section ‎ 4.1). They mean, in this case, that even if the real players pooled their information, 
their messages would not tell them anything about the state of nature beyond what they can 
learn already from their types. 
4.2.1  Independence lemma and the default mechanism 
The definition of mechanism in effect posits that the randomness or uncertainty regarding the 
messages that the players receive has two independent potential sources: the inherent 
randomness of the type profile, which the messages may reflect, and residual randomness, 
which persists also with a specified type profile (and reflects, for example, the use of noisy 
communication channels). The following lemma shows that the assumption that the two 
sources are independent involves no loss of generality. Any joint distribution of types and 
                                                            
7 The symbol  
 
 denotes equality in distribution. 
8 A distribution is degenerate if it assigns probability   to some value. For example, this is the case in (1). 
9 As an example of this distinction, if a mechanism satisfies   ̃, and the types of all but two players change, 
the distribution of the message that each of these two receives does not change. However, the joint 
distribution of the two messages may change, for example, uncorrelated messages may become 
correlated. By contrast,   would imply that the joint distribution also does not change when the other 
players’ types change. A subtler, yet highly consequential (See Section ‎ 5.1), difference between   and   ̃ 
applies also to two-player games.  
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messages can be produced by “mixing” the random type profile   with a suitable mechanism  , 
which by definition is independent of  .  
Lemma 1. Let                     be any finite product set and   any probability measure 
on       whose marginal on   is equal to the common prior. There exists a random variable   
that is independent of the random type profile  , with values that are functions from   to  , 
such that the joint distribution of   and      is equal to   and, in addition:  
(i)   The random profiles {    }    are independent. 
(ii)   For every       and       there is some        such that        
               
       and (2) holds. 
(iii)   For every               ( ) holds. 
Proof. Given a probability measure   as above, construct a family {    }    of independent 
random variables with values in  , indexed by the type profiles, that are collectively 
independent of   and are distributed as follows. For             , the distribution of      is 
the probability measure on   that assigns to each element   the (conditional) probability   
  {     } 
   { } 
  
Note that this already implies that the joint distribution of   and      is equal to  :  
                        { }                  {     }                
For             , choose for each       some type profile    such that        
              . 
The distribution of                              is then completely specified the 
requirement that (2) and (3) hold.  ∎ 
A mechanism   as in Lemma 1 is referred to in this paper as the default mechanism of the 
measure  .
10 The three special properties that the default mechanism is required to possess 
may seem purely technical. Property (4) concerns relations between different type profiles, 
which by definition cannot coexist (since only one type profile is realized), while (5) (which is not 
trivial only for             ) and (6) concern type profiles   that cannot occur (             ). 
However, property (4) is not innocuous, as it essentially prevents the mechanism from satisfying 
  or   unless it also satisfies  . This is because two random variables that are equal and 
independent necessarily have a degenerate distribution. Mainly because of this limitation, it is 
not possible to restrict attention to default mechanisms. They are, however, useful technical 
constructs.  
4.3  Correlated strategies 
A correlated strategy in an  -player Bayesian game is a pair       consisting of a mechanism   
and a profile of strategies                 . The strategy of each player   is a function 
                that specifies how the player’s type    and the message he receives    
together determine the player’s action   .
11 As indicated, the messages are part of the 
correlated strategy’s specification rather than the game. Their (potential) randomness and that 
of the types means that the actions are also random. The random action profile corresponding 
to a correlated strategy       is the random variable                  given by  
                                                            
10 Since some aspects of the default mechanism are only partially specified, the definition actually allows 
for more than one version of it. Any reference to the default mechanism is taken to mean that differences 
between versions are irrelevant. 
11 By assumption, the specification of the actions is deterministic; randomized actions are not allowed. 
This assumption involves no loss of generality and, in particular, does not preclude mixed strategies. It 
only means that even private randomization is viewed as part of a single large mechanism. If there is 
already a mechanism from which the players receive messages, randomization may be relegated to it. 
This may be done by appending a random number to the massage that each player receives, such that the 
  random numbers are independent. A mechanism modified in this way does not satisfy  , but the 
modification has no effect on properties     ̃     ̃ or  . 
(4) 
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Pure- and mixed-strategy profiles are essentially special cases of correlated strategy. If the 
message that each player receives is unaffected by his or the others’ types and is also non-
random, that is, if the mechanism satisfies  ,   and   (which effectively means that there are 
no messages at all), then, for some fixed           , 
                       
In this case, for each player  ,    associates a (deterministic) action    with each type   , which 
means that the correlated strategy is effectively a pure-strategy profile. A mixed-strategy profile 
is described by a correlated strategy with a mechanism that satisfies  ,   and  . These 
properties of the mechanism mean that the messages are independent and equal to 
                       , where    is any fixed type profile. The corresponding random action 
profile is  
                                               
This is effectively the same as, and it can be implemented by, private randomization over pure 
strategies independently for each player.
12  
The correlated strategy distribution (CSD) of a correlated strategy       is the joint distribution 
of the random type profile   and the random action profile   specified by (7). Many different 
correlated strategies, employing different mechanisms, may have the same CSD. A CSD is 
implementable by a mechanism   (which implements the distribution) if it is the distribution of 
some correlated strategy of the form      , that is, if suitable strategies            exist. A 
CSD is a pure-strategy distribution or a mixed-strategy distribution if it is implementable by some 
mechanism   with properties  ,   and   or properties  ,   and  , respectively. The former is 
obviously a special case of the latter, which in turn is a special case of type correlated 
distribution, which is defined as a CSD that is implementable by a mechanism with property   
(that is, one whose message to each player may reflect the player’s type but is not affected by 
the types of the other players). 
Every CSD   is a probability measure on       whose marginal on   coincides with the common 
prior   .
13 Hence, it has a default mechanism   (see Section ‎ 4.2.1), in which the message space 
   of each player   is his action space   . Thus, the default mechanism simply tells each player 
what action to take. The default correlated strategy of   is defined as      , where  
                       
Thus, each player’s strategy simply instructs him to obey the default mechanism. The 
resulting random action profile  , called the default random action profile of  , satisfies 
                                                       
The second equality shows that the default mechanism   of a CSD   implements it. 
Obviously, a similar equality holds for the default mechanism and strategy of any probability 
measure on       with the marginal   . Hence, every such measure is a CSD. This conclusion 
establishes the following simple result.  
Lemma 2. In a Bayesian game, a probability measure on       is a correlated strategy 
distribution if and only if its marginal on   is equal to the common prior. 
                                                            
12 A correlated strategy with a mechanism as above may alternatively be viewed as a behavior strategy for 
each player, that is, a randomized action for each of the player’s types. 
13 Since the common prior is given as part of the specification of the game, a CSD may also be viewed as 
an assignment of a probability measure on   to every type profile  , namely, the distribution of the 
players’ action when their types are given by  . If   lies outside the support of   , the probability measure 
may be chosen arbitrarily. 
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4.4  Correlated equilibria 
The players’ incentives in a Bayesian game are embodied by their payoff functions,           . 
For a correlated strategy      , the expected payoff (hereafter referred to usually simply as the 
payoff) of each player   is the expectation of the random variable        , where   is the 
random type profile and   is the random action profile given by (7). The correlated strategy is 
incentive compatible if none of the players   can increase his payoff by unilateral deviation, that 
is, by switching from    to some other strategy   
              . Equivalently, incentive 
compatibility means that the action that the correlated strategy specifies for each player   
always maximizes the conditional expectation
14 of        , given the player’s type and the 
message he receives. The latter condition is used in the following definition.  
Definition 1. In a Bayesian game, a correlated strategy       is a correlated equilibrium if the 
corresponding random action profile   is such that, for every player   and action   
  for that 
player, 
                    
        ∣                
The correlated strategy distribution of a correlated equilibrium is referred to as a correlated 
equilibrium distribution (CED). A CED is implementable by a mechanism   if it is the CSD of 
some correlated equilibrium with that mechanism. A CED is a pure-equilibrium distribution or a 
mixed-equilibrium distribution if it is implementable by some mechanism   with properties  ,   
and   or properties  ,   and  , respectively, in other words, if it is the CSD of some correlated 
equilibrium employing a mechanism with the first or second set of properties (a correlated 
equilibrium of either kind is called a Bayesian equilibrium). Two additional kinds of CEDs are 
named in Section ‎ 6.3.  
As the following lemma shows, to check whether a given correlated strategy distribution is a 
correlated equilibrium distribution it suffices to consider its default correlated strategy. The 
lemma also presents an equivalent characterization of CED, which does not explicitly refer to 
correlated equilibrium. Like Definition 1, it is formulated in terms of random variables (whose 
joint distribution is the CED). However, the characterization could also be expressed in purely 
measure theoretic terms.  
Lemma 3. For a correlated strategy distribution   in a Bayesian game, the following conditions 
are equivalent: 
(i)    is a correlated equilibrium distribution. 
(ii)  Its default correlated strategy is a correlated equilibrium. 
(iii) For some (equivalently, every
15) random variable                  such that the joint 
distribution of   and   is equal to  , 
                    
        ∣ ∣                      
        
Proof. Condition (i) means that   is the CSD of some correlated strategy       that satisfies 
the condition in Definition 1. For every player  , taking the condition expectation of both sides of 
(10), given    and   , yields 
 ( (                  
        ∣ ∣         ) ∣ ∣       )      
                                                            
14 For a random variable   and a real-valued random variable   that are defined on the same probability 
space, the conditional expectation     ∣    is also a random variable on that space. It is constant on every 
event of the form         (where   takes a particular value  ), and its value there is     ∣       , i.e., the 
conditional expectation of  , given that      . The meaning of equalities and inequalities involving 
conditional expectations is that they hold with probability   (equivalently, hold pointwise). 
15 The equivalence holds since whether or not the inequality in (11) holds only depends on the joint 
distribution of   and  . 
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Since, by (7),    can be expressed as a function of    and      , the iterated conditional 
expectation in (12) is equal to the single one in (11) (see Shiryaev, 1996, Chapter I, §8). Hence, 
(iii) holds.  
Conversely, if   satisfies (iii), then in particular (11) holds when   is the default random action 
profile. By (9), the inequality in this case coincides with (10), which shows that the default 
correlated strategy       is a correlated equilibrium. This proves that (iii) implies (ii), which in 
turn implies (i). ∎ 
A probability measure   on       that satisfies the equivalent conditions in Lemma 3 is 
sometimes referred to itself as a correlated equilibrium (Bergemann and Morris, 2007). Another 
reasonable alternative definition of this concept would be a mechanism that recommends an 
action to each player, which together with the strategies of following the recommendations 
constitutes a correlated equilibrium in the sense of Definition 1. Lemma 3 shows that these two 
alternative definitions of correlated equilibrium are not fundamentally different from Definition 
1. However, this paper emphatically distinguishes between correlated equilibrium and 
correlated equilibrium distribution, and between correlated equilibrium and the mechanism it 
employs. These distinctions are instrumental for the paper’s primary objective of studying the 
implementability relation between a correlated equilibrium distribution and a mechanism, 
which is the existence of some correlated equilibrium with that mechanism that has that 
distribution.  
4.5  Communication equilibria 
Communication equilibrium differs from correlated equilibrium in that the players self-report 
their types to the mechanism. Correspondingly, the incentive-compatibility condition of 
correlated equilibrium is augmented by the requirement that a player cannot gain from being 
the only one to misreport his type (and possibly also deviate from the correlated strategy). The 
reliance on the players’ reports turns the mechanism from a primary source of information 
about the (other) players’ types to a secondary source – a mediator. The mediator may be a 
physical entity, such as a disinterested third party or a machine, or it may be a communication 
protocol, such as one-shot direct exchange of messages between players.
16 Note that in the last 
example, the assumption that the mechanism receives type reports as input does not exclude 
the exchange of more complicated messages. This is because each player could in principle use a 
gadget that takes type as input and outputs any required message. The players’ individual 
gadgets could then be viewed collectively as a single mechanism, in the sense of the definition in 
Section ‎ 4.2. This mechanism is still rather special in that it has property  : the massage that a 
player receives is unaffected by his own type. In the context of communication equilibrium, this 
and the other fundamental properties of mechanisms described in Section ‎ 4.2 may be 
interpreted as specific limitations on the allowed kinds of communication protocols.   
With a correlated strategy      , a player   who misreports his type as   
  changes the (random) 
messages that the mechanism sends to the players from     , where              is the (true) 
random type profile, to     
      . The player may take advantage of the resulting change of the 
other players’ actions by appropriately changing the strategy he himself uses for determining 
the response to the mechanism’s message, from    to some   
              . The resulting 
random action profile         
    
       
    is given by  
  
      
          
         
  
                
                 { }  
Communication equilibrium is defined by the requirement that, regardless of player  ’s true 
type, misreporting it in the above manner and changing the strategy cannot increase  ’s 
expected payoff.  
                                                            
16 The question of how, and to what extent, can unmediated communication between players replace a 
mediator or a correlation device lies outside to scope of this paper. This question has been extensively 
studied in the contexts of both complete and incomplete information games. See, for example, Forges 
(1990), Ben-Porath (2003), Gerardi (2004) and references therein.  
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Definition 2. In a Bayesian game, a correlated strategy       is a communication equilibrium if, 
for every player  , type   
  for that player and function   
              , 
                     ∣ ∣           
where   and    are given by (7) and (13), respectively. 
A generalization of the revelation-principle argument invoked in the first paragraph of this 
subsection shows that the set of possible communication equilibrium outcomes would not 
change if players were allowed to send to the mechanism arbitrary (rather than only type) 
reports, possibly affected by private randomization. For a player   of type   , such a general 
report might be described as a random variable       , with values in some finite (say) set     A 
corresponding generalized mechanism would be a random variable   ̂, with values that are 
functions from                 to  . Thus, if the players send to the mechanism the reports 
                 , its response is the random profile of messages   ̂   . The action    of each 
player   would then be determined as some function   ̂  by the player’s type   , the report    he 
sent to the mechanism and the message    he got in response:  
       ̂             
The reason this setup is in fact no more general than the one described above is that there 
exists a “normal” correlated strategy that induces identical actions. The mechanism   it 
employs simply internalizes the players’ reporting process. That is, for each type profile  , the 
random message it sends to each player   is the pair 
          ̂                             
A player   of type    who receives a message         then determine his action according to the 
strategy    defined by 
                   ̂             
It is a simple and standard exercise to show that if with the generalized mechanism none of the 
players   could increase his expected payoff by changing               (which specifies the report 
he sends) and/or   ̂  (which specifies his response to the mechanism’s messages), then the 
correlated strategy       is a communication equilibrium in the sense of Definition 2.  
A similar argument, which is also part of the revelation principle, shows that in every Bayesian 
game the set of communication equilibrium outcomes would not change also if the messages 
that the mechanism sends to the players were required to be concrete action recommendations 
rather than arbitrary objects. (Such a mechanism is also called a mediation plan. See Myerson, 
1994.) More specifically, if a correlated strategy distribution is a communication equilibrium 
distribution (MED), that is, if it is the CSD of some communication equilibrium, then it is also the 
CSD of a communication equilibrium where (i) the message spaces coincide with the respective 
players’ actions spaces and (ii) each player’s equilibrium strategy is to act according to the 
message he receives. This observation shows that communication equilibrium as defined in this 
paper is not a fundamentally different concept than, e.g., in Myerson (1994), where (i) and (ii) 
are part of the definition. However, as for correlated equilibria, this does not mean that 
attention can be restricted to communication equilibria of this special kind. Doing so, and thus 
effectively dispensing with the distinction between mechanism (which is the mediator or 
communication protocol used) and correlated strategy (which also describes how the players 
react to the messages they receive), might affect in unwarranted ways the properties of the 
implementing mechanisms. This is demonstrated by the simple example of two players who 
base their choice of actions on their own type and on a type report that they receive from the 
other player. A mechanism that simply transmits the reports has property  , but a mechanism 
that is required to explicitly indicate each player’s action cannot have that property.  16 
 
Figure 1. Hasse diagram of the different attributes of correlated strategy distributions (CSDs) in Bayesian games, 
ordered by implication. An attribute is represented by a box that contains its equivalent definitions, each of which 
is a set of fundamental properties possessed by some mechanism that implements the CSD. Two sets in the same 
box identify kinds of mechanisms that implement exactly the same CSDs. For those in different boxes, the 
implementable CSDs are different. An arrow from one box to another indicates that the first attribute implies the 
second one but the reverse implication does not hold. 
The question of which fundamental properties a mechanism that implements a given 
communication equilibrium distribution can possibly have is central for this work. To put it 
somewhat simplistically, these properties describe how simple the implementing mechanisms 
can be. The classification of MEDs presented in Section ‎ 7 below may correspondingly be viewed 
as reflecting the extent to which the workload of the mediator or communication protocol can 
be reduced by off-loading some of it to the individual players – in the sense of employing a 
simpler mechanism but possibly more complicated strategies – without affecting the outcome.
17 
This classification reflects and is partially based on similar classifications of correlated strategies 
and correlated equilibria, which are presented in the next two sections. 
5  Attributes of Correlated Strategy Distributions 
The six fundamental properties of mechanisms described in Section ‎ 4.2 are not independent. 
Property   implies   ̃, property   implies   ̃, and   implies  . Therefore, for each of the three 
pairs, a mechanism may satisfy both properties, only the second one, or none of them. 
Altogether, there are (    ) 27 possibilities. This classification of mechanisms induces a 
classification of correlated strategy distributions. For a set of properties     {    ̃     ̃    }, a 
CSD is  -implementable if it is implementable by some mechanism that has all the properties in 
 . For example, a CSD is  -implementable if it is implementable by some mechanism with 
property  , and it is    -implementable if it is implementable by some mechanism that has both 
property   and property  .
18  
The various attributes of CSDs are not independent. For example,    -implementability 
implies   ̃  -implementability, since   is a more stringent requirement than   ̃, and it is implied 
                                                            
17 Note that this issue is quite different from that mentioned in footnote 16. In particular, the latter 
concerns changes of mechanism that typically make it more rather than less complex. 
18 Since implementability concerns sets of properties, a more accurate, though unwieldy, notation would 
be { }- and {   }-implementability.    
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by      -implementability, which involves the additional requirement that the implementing 
mechanism also satisfies  . A natural question for each of these implications is whether the 
reverse implication also holds, so that the two attributes are actually equivalent. As the Hasse 
diagram in Figure 1 shows, the answer is affirmative for    - and   ̃  -implementability (which 
are equivalent) but negative for    - and      -implementability (which are not equivalent). 
Thus, every CSD that is implementable by some mechanism that satisfies   ̃ and   is also 
implementable by a mechanism that satisfies   and   (and, obviously, vice versa), and there is 
some such CSD in some Bayesian game that is not implementable by any mechanism that also 
satisfies  .  
As Figure 1 shows, there are not 27 but only 7 distinct (i.e., nonequivalent) attributes of CSDs 
that can be defined in terms of fundamental properties of the implementing mechanisms. The 
attributes are not all comparable. That is, some of them neither imply nor are implied by certain 
other attributes. Each attribute can be described in several equivalent ways by using different 
combinations of properties. For example,  -implementability and   ̃-implementability are both 
equivalent to the attribute of simply being a CSD, which is denoted in Figure 1 by the empty set 
(of fundamental properties of implementing mechanisms) { }. Thus, the limitations that these 
two properties put on the implementing mechanisms are inconsequential. This result and all the 
others that are presented by Figure 1 are proved in ‎ Appendix A. 
Additional attributes of correlated strategy distributions in Bayesian games may conceivably be 
defined by conjunction. For example, a CSD may be both   ̃-implementable and  -
implementable. A natural question is whether this attribute is equivalent to   ̃  -
implementability. More generally, if there is some implementing mechanism with a particular 
set of properties and another mechanism with some other properties, does it follow that the 
CSD is implementable by a single mechanism that has all the properties of the other two? 
Lemma 5 in ‎ Appendix A answers this question in the affirmative. Hence, conjunctions do not in 
fact define new attributes of correlated strategy distributions. In this, the latter differ from 
correlated equilibrium distributions, for which conjunctions do give rise to new attributes (see 
Section ‎ 6).  
5.1  Intrinsic characterizations 
Each of the seven attributes of CSDs in Figure 1 can also be characterized intrinsically, that is, 
without explicitly referring to implementing mechanisms.
19 The significance of intrinsic 
characterization is that it gives an additional, concrete meaning to the attribute, and may help 
to check whether particular distributions have it. Lemma 2 may be viewed as an intrinsic 
characterization of the weakest attribute (I in Figure 1), which is simply being a CSD. The 
following proposition characterizes the strongest attribute, which is being a pure-strategy 
distribution (attribute VII), as well as the attribute of being a mixed-strategy distribution (VI). 
The proofs of this and the next two propositions are given in ‎ Appendix A. 
Proposition 1. A correlated strategy distribution   is a mixed-strategy distribution if and only if 
the following holds for some (equivalently, every) random variable                  such 
that the joint distribution of   and   is equal to  :  
(i)  For each player  ,    and           are conditionally independent, given   . 
A correlated strategy distribution is a pure-strategy distribution if and only if it satisfies the 
stronger condition in which (i) is replaced by: 
(ii)  For each player  , the conditional distribution   , given   , is degenerate. 
An intrinsic characterization of type correlated distributions is given by the next proposition. The 
characterizing property in this case is the existence of a probability measure   on   
       
    
     
   that satisfies a certain condition. By definition,   assigns a probability to each pure-
                                                            
19 Note that ‘intrinsic’ is not a strict, formal notion. However, the discussion below and in ‎ Appendix A 
should make its meaning clear. 18 
strategy profile    
    
      
    
        
    
      (see Section ‎ 4.1). For each type profile 
       
     
       
   , there is a corresponding marginal measure    on                , 
which assigns to each action profile                  the probability that the actions 
associated with the types specified by   are those specified by  . Formally, 
   { }     ({   
    
      
    
        
    
         
       
          
  
∣ ∣    
     
       
       })  
Proposition 2. A correlated strategy distribution   is a type correlated distribution if and only if 
there is a probability measure   on   
       
          
   such that the marginal measure 
defined above coincides with the conditional probability of action profiles, that is,  
   { }   
  {     } 
   { } 
                      
The intrinsic characterization in Proposition 2 is not as straightforward as those in Proposition 1. 
According to the latter, pure-strategy distributions are characterized by the property that 
knowing a player’s type entails knowing his action, and mixed-strategy distributions are 
characterized by the weaker property that if a player’s type is known, his action does not add 
any information about the other players’ types or actions.
20 It would seem that type correlated 
distributions ought to be characterized by the even weaker property that, if a player’s type is 
known, his action does not add any information about the other players’ types (but may do so 
for the actions). This property can be formally expressed as follows (Forges, 1993). 
Definition 3. A correlated strategy distribution   has the conditional independence property if 
for some (equivalently, every) random variable   such that the joint distribution of   and   is 
equal to  , the action    of each player   and the types     of the other players are conditionally 
independent, given  ’s own type   . 
Every type correlated distribution has the conditional independence property. This is because, if 
a correlated strategy distribution is implementable by a mechanism whose message to each 
player is unaffected by the other players’ types, it is impossible to learn from the player’s action 
anything about the others’ types. However, somewhat surprisingly, the converse it not true. As 
Example 1 demonstrates
21 (see also Lehrer at al., 2010, and Forges, 2006), even in a two-player 
game a correlated strategy distribution may have the conditional independence property 
without being a type correlated distribution.
22 As the next proposition shows, the non-
equivalence of these two attributes of CEDs reflects a difference between properties   and   ̃ of 
mechanisms. Whereas being a type correlated distribution by definition means  -
implementability (attribute V in Figure 1), the conditional independence property is equivalent 
to the weaker requirement of   ̃-implementability (attribute IV). 
Proposition 3. A correlated strategy distribution is   ̃-implementable if and only if it has the 
conditional independence property. 
Intrinsic characterizations for the remaining two attributes of CSDs (II and III in Figure 1) are 
given by Proposition 4 in ‎ Appendix A.  
6  Attributes of Correlated Equilibrium Distributions 
A correlated equilibrium distribution in a Bayesian game is also a correlated strategy distribution 
but the opposite is not always true. However, since every correlated strategy distribution can be 
made a correlated equilibrium distribution simply by replacing the payoff functions with 
constant ones, the number of distinct (i.e., nonequivalent) attributes of CEDs that can be  
                                                            
20 For an extension of this result to games with a random number of players, see Milchtaich (2004, 
Theorem 2). 
21 Note that the demonstration can be read as a proof that a probability measure   as in Proposition 2 
does not exist for Example 1, because no strategy profile can belong to its support.    
22 Forges (1993) and Cotter’s (1994) suggestion that the conditional independence property characterizes 
type correlated distributions is mistaken. The mistake was corrected in Forges (2006).  
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Figure 2. Hasse diagram of the different attributes of correlated equilibrium distributions (CEDs) in Bayesian games, 
ordered by implication. As in Figure 1, each attribute is represented by a box, and an implication relation is 
represented by an arrow. A conjunction symbol   means that the CED is implementable both by a mechanism 
satisfying one property and by a mechanism satisfying the other property. The box marked with a question mark 
represents an attribute that may or may not be equivalent to the one below it. If the former holds, the two boxes 
need to be merged.   
defined in terms of fundamental properties of the implementing mechanisms is not smaller than 
for CSDs. In fact, as Figure 2 shows, the number is significantly larger: 14 or 15 instead of 7. This 
reflects the fact that the classifications of CEDs can be viewed as consisting of two layers: (i) the 
classification induced by the different attributes of CSDs, and (ii) the refinement that results 
from also taking into account the incentive compatibility requirement ((iii) in Lemma 3). Thus, 
two CEDs in a Bayesian game may differ (i) in that even as CSDs they require different kinds of 
implementing mechanisms, or (ii) only in that different kinds of implementing mechanisms are 
compatible with the equilibrium condition. This is a useful distinction, which seems to be lacking 
in the existing literature on games with incomplete information. 
Where the equilibrium condition is effective is the connection between a player’s type and the 
messages he receives, i.e., properties   and   ̃ of the mechanism. For CSDs these properties do 
not make any difference, as can be seen in Figure 1, but this is not so for CEDs. In particular, the 
three attributes of simply being a CED,  -implementability and   ̃-implementability (I, Ia and Ib in 
Figure 2) are not equivalent. As Examples 2 and 3 show, there are CEDs in some Bayesian games 
that cannot be implemented by any mechanism satisfying   ̃, and there are CEDs that are 
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implementable by such a mechanism but cannot be implemented by any mechanism with the 
stronger property  .  
The reason   and   ̃ affect implementability of CEDs is that these properties may entail inability 
to restrict messages to certain types of players only. This is not a problem for correlated 
strategies, where information cannot do any harm, but it may be a problem for correlated 
equilibria, where incentive compatibility comes into play. However, as can be seen in Figure 2, 
whether this is actually so depends on the other properties of the mechanism. For example, for 
  ̃-implementable CEDs (IV in Figure 2), requiring that the implementing mechanism also 
satisfies   or   ̃ does not make any difference.  
The various relations between attributes of correlated equilibrium distributions shown in Figure 
2 are established in ‎ Appendix B. The next subsection takes a closer look at the connection 
between these attributes and those of correlated strategy distributions. The subsequent 
subsection presents another source of difference between the two sets of attributes. The last 
subsection examines in detail a couple of particular attributes.  
6.1  Attributes inherited from correlated strategy distributions 
As a correlated strategy distribution, a correlated equilibrium distribution has one or more of 
the attributes in Figure 1, which are based on the fundamental properties of the implementing 
mechanisms. However, a CED that, as a CSD, is implementable by a mechanism with particular 
properties is not necessarily implementable by such a mechanism also as a CED. That is, it may 
be impossible to find a correlated strategy with that kind of mechanism that is also a correlated 
equilibrium. For example, as indicated, the CED in Example 2 is not   ̃-implementable, but it is   ̃-
implementable as a CSD (indeed, this is so for every CSD; see Figure 1). However, as the 
following theorem shows, this kind of discrepancy between the two notions of implementability 
may arise only when properties   or   ̃ of mechanisms are involved. The proof of the theorem is 
given in ‎ Appendix B. 
Theorem 1. For     {    ̃    }, a correlated equilibrium distribution is implementable by a 
mechanism with all the properties in   if and only if it satisfies a similar condition as a 
correlated strategy distribution. 
Since the four fundamental properties considered in Theorem 1 are sufficient to characterize all 
the attributes of CSDs in Figure 1, it follows from the theorem that a CED has attribute I, II, III, IV, 
V, VI or VII in Figure 2 if and only if, as a CSD, it has the similarly numbered attribute in Figure 1. 
For example, a CED is a pure- or mixed-equilibrium distribution if and only if it is a pure- or 
mixed-strategy distribution, respectively. The intrinsic characterizations of the various attributes 
of CSDs given by Propositions 1 through 4 therefore apply also to the similarly numbered 
attributes of CEDs. For example, a CED is   ̃-implementable (attribute IV in Figure 2) if and only if 
it has the conditional independence property. An intrinsic characterization for the very attribute 
of being a CED (I in Figure 2) is given by condition (iii) in Lemma 3, which says that a CSD is a CED 
if and only if it satisfies a certain incentive-compatibility condition (for distributions). It follows 
that, for example, an   ̃-implementable CED can be (intrinsically) characterized as a CSD that 
satisfies the incentive-compatibility condition and has the conditional independence property.  
6.2  Attributes defined by conjunction 
Attributes of CSDs and those of CEDs show not only similarities but also differences. One such 
difference concerns the effect of conjunctions. As indicated in Section ‎ 5, if a CSD that is 
implementable by a mechanism with a particular fundamental property is also implementable 
by a mechanism with another property, then it is implementable by a single mechanism that has 
both properties. It follows from Theorem 1 that this remains true for CEDs as long as the 
fundamental properties concerned do not include   or   ̃. However, Examples 6 and 7 
in ‎ Appendix B show that, without the qualification, the result would not hold. Specifically, a CED 
that is implementable by a mechanism with property   as well as by a mechanism with property 
  may not be implementable by any mechanism with both properties, and the same is true with 
  replaced by  .  21 
The conjunction of  - and  -implementability (as in Example 6) and the conjunction of  - and  -
implementability (Example 7) are two attributes of CEDs that have no parallels among the 
attributes of CSDs. A third attribute that is defined in a similar manner may exist, namely, the 
conjunction of   ̃- and  -implementability. However, its existence is still an open question: it is 
not known whether this third attribute is indeed distinct from the second one. This uncertainty 
is represented in Figure 2 by a question mark. In any case, by Theorem 2 below, these two or 
three attributes of CEDs are the only ones that can be defined (only) by conjunctions; additional 
such attributes do not exist.  
6.3  Type correlated and strategy correlated equilibria 
As an illustration of the discussion in the previous two subsections, this one describes in detail 
two of the attributes of correlated equilibrium distributions in Figure 2:  -implementability 
(attribute V), which is inherited from correlated strategy distributions, and the “spin-off” 
attribute    -implementability (Va). Both attributes have been previously described in the 
literature, under various names. The  -implementable CEDs may be referred to as type 
correlated equilibrium distributions, as they are the distributions of type correlated equilibria 
(Cotter, 1994), also known as agent normal form correlated equilibria (Forges, 1993, 2006; 
Lehrer et al., 2006, 2010). The    -implementable CEDs may be referred to as strategy 
correlated equilibrium distributions, as they are the distributions of strategy correlated 
equilibria (Cotter, 1991), also known as strategic (normal) form correlated equilibria (Forges, 
1993, 2006; Lehrer et al., 2010).  
In a strategy correlated equilibrium, a referee who does not know the players’ types 
confidentially recommends a strategy to each player. The recommendations are necessarily 
independent of the players’ actual types but not necessarily of one another. The equilibrium 
condition is that it is always optimal for each player to take the action that the strategy 
recommended by the referee prescribes to his actual type, assuming that all the other players 
do the same. In the terminology of this work, in which a referee corresponds to a mechanism, 
the assumption that he does not know the players’ types corresponds to the properties   and  , 
which together mean that the players’ types do not affect the messages.  
A type correlated equilibrium differs from a strategy correlated equilibrium in that each player is 
not told the whole strategy but only the action it prescribes to his actual type. However, it is still 
assumed that the referee does not know the players’ types when he chooses his 
recommendations. Myerson (1991, p. 262) finds this assumption unnatural. Even though the 
referee does not know the player’s type, he is able to prevent him from learning what he is not 
supposed to know, namely, the actions that the recommended strategy prescribes to each of 
the player’s other possible types. However, as noted by Cotter (1994), such differentiation can 
be achieved if different types perceive the information presented to them differently. For 
example, different instructions may be issued to unilingual English and French readers simply by 
handing out a bilingual sheet with English and French texts that do not match. Alternatively, the 
mediator may simply learn the player’s type after choosing his recommendation but before 
sending the message. Either way, the message that each player receives may depend on his own 
type, so that the mechanism only has property  .  
Forges (1993) showed that some type correlated equilibria are not equivalent to any strategy 
correlated equilibrium. The next example provides another, simple demonstration of this result. 
Note that this example, and all the other examples in this paper that concern correlated strategy 
distributions or correlated equilibrium distributions, involve two-player games. This reflects 
(indeed, establishes) the fact that the Hasse diagrams in Figure 1 and Figure 2 apply to two-
player Bayesian games as well as to the general,  -player case.  
Example 5 A correlated equilibrium distribution that is  - but not    -implementable  
Two players play a coordination game. They have the same action space, {   }, and the same 
payoff matrix,  
       
 
 
(   
   
)   22 
Player 1 can be of type    or type   , which are both equally likely, and player 2 has the single 
type   . A mechanism bases its messages to the players on the outcomes of two independent 
coin tosses,    and   , each of which gives   or   with equal probabilities. A player of type 
   or    receives the message    or   , respectively. This mechanism and the strategies that 
instruct the players to act according to the message the mechanism sends them together 
constitute a correlated equilibrium. At the equilibrium, types    and    of player 1 receive the 
expected payoffs   and    , respectively, and player 2 gets     . It is easy to check that, in all 
three cases, profitable deviations do not exist.  
The above mechanism has properties   ̃ and  . Player 1’s type is not reflected by the message he 
receives (which has probability     of being   whether the type is    or   ), and has no effect 
whatsoever on player 2’s message. Thus, the corresponding correlated equilibrium distribution 
is   ̃  -, and in particular  -, implementable. However, the CED is not implementable by any 
mechanism that satisfies   and  , i.e., one in which the messages to both players are unaffected 
by 1’s type. The reason is that, in any correlated equilibrium that employs such a mechanism, 
the expected payoffs for the two types of player 1 must be equal. Otherwise, one of them could 
increase his payoff by mimicking the other type’s reaction to the message he receives.  
7  Attributes of Communication Equilibrium Distributions 
A communication equilibrium in a Bayesian game is also a correlated equilibrium but the 
opposite is generally false. Whereas for correlated equilibrium the only incentive compatibility 
requirement is that a player cannot gain from taking a different action than that prescribed by 
the correlated strategy, communication equilibrium adds the requirement that reporting the 
type truthfully is also incentive compatible.   
The second incentive compatibility requirement obviously has no bite if the mechanism ignores 
the players’ type reports, that is, if it has properties   and  . Thus, if a correlated equilibrium 
distribution is implementable by a mechanism with these properties, it is automatically a 
communication equilibrium distribution. Among the attributes in Figure 2,    -implementability 
is in fact the weakest attribute of a CED that guarantees that it is also a MED.
23 Hence, for any 
given set of fundamental properties, the CEDs that are implementable by mechanisms with (all) 
these properties are either (i) all    -implementable, and hence MEDs, or (ii) not all MEDs. 
Significantly, in case (ii), those CEDs that are MEDs are not necessarily implementable as MEDs 
by a mechanism with the given properties. That is, a communication equilibrium with such a 
mechanism may not exist. This is demonstrated by Example 4, where the MED described is not 
 -implementable even though it has that attribute as a CED. Thus, MEDs and CEDs are not 
connected by a relation similar to that in Theorem 1, which concerns CEDs and CSDs.  
Example 4 also shows that a result similar to that in Lemma 3 does not hold for communication 
equilibrium distributions: the default correlated strategy is not necessarily a communication 
equilibrium. The reason for this difference between correlated and communication equilibria is 
that, in the latter, the messages that the mechanism sends when it receives type reports that 
are patently not all truthful (since the profile of reported types lies outside the support of the 
common prior) cannot be chosen arbitrarily. The mechanism’s reaction to such reports has to 
induce actions that ensure that the player who lied about his type (who may or may not be 
identifiable) is not rewarded. The feasibility of such a reaction may depend on the properties of 
the implementing mechanism.  
Implementability by a mechanism with a particular set of fundamental properties is an attribute 
of MEDs, just as for CEDs and CSDs. As in Sections ‎ 5 and ‎ 6, a basic question, for each such 
attribute of MEDs or a conjunction of several attributes, is: which of the other attributes are 
implied by it? The answer is given by the Hasse diagram in Figure 3, which presents the 
implication relations among the various attributes of communication equilibrium distributions.  
                                                            
23 This assertion is proved by Examples 4 and 5. The former presents three    -implementable CEDs 
which are not MEDs, and the latter presents an   ̃  -implementable CED where the otherwise identical 
two types of player 1 receive different payoffs, which is clearly impossible in a MED.  23 
 
Figure 3. Hasse diagram of the different attributes of communication equilibrium distributions (MEDs) in Bayesian 
games, ordered by implication. Each attribute is represented by a box, and an implication relation is represented by 
an arrow. A conjunction symbol   means that the MED is implementable both by a mechanism satisfying one 
property or pair of properties and by a mechanism satisfying the other property. A box marked with a question 
mark represents an attribute that may or may not be equivalent to the one below it. If the former holds, the two 
boxes need to be merged.   
Comparison with the corresponding diagram for correlated equilibrium distributions (Figure 2) 
shows that, among the attributes that are defined by a single set of fundamental properties of 
mechanisms, the implication relations for MEDs and CEDs are identical. However, this is not so 
for attributes that are defined by conjunction. For example, for MEDs, unlike for CEDs, the 
conjunction of  - and  -implementability does not imply    -implementability. This is 
demonstrated by Example 8 in ‎ Appendix C, which presents an MED that is both  - and  -
implementable but is not    -implementable. The appendix also includes the proofs all the 
other results that are expressed by Figure 3.  
8  Synthesis 
The three collections of attributes of distributions presented in the preceding three sections are 
complete in the sense of closedness under conjunctions. That is, each collection includes every 
attribute that can be defined as the conjunction of several of its elements, i.e., as the quality of 
possessing all of these attributes. This result is formally expressed by the following theorem, 
which is proved near the end of ‎ Appendix C.  
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Theorem 2. The conjunction of any number of the attributes of correlated strategy distributions 
in Figure 1, correlated equilibrium distributions in Figure 2 or communication equilibrium 
distributions in Figure 3 is equivalent to one of the attributes in the same figure. 
Each of the three collections of attributes is a two-dimensional lattice with respect to the 
implication relation. The two-dimensionality is proved by the fact that, in each Hasse diagram, 
the different attributes are vertically and horizontally arranged in such a way that an attributes 
implies another if and only if the center of the box representing the latter is located higher and 
left of that of the former. The horizontal dimension corresponds to the attributes of equilibria in 
complete information games: pure-strategy, mixed-strategy and correlated equilibrium. The 
vertical dimension corresponds to the possible ways in which the players’ types are connected 
with the messages that an implementing mechanism sends.  
The assertion that the three collections of attributes are lattices means that every two attributes 
have a greatest lower bound (or infimum) and a least upper bound (or supremum). The greatest 
lower bound, also called the meet of the two attributes, is the unique attribute in the 
corresponding Hasse diagram that (i) implies both attributes and (ii) is implied by every other 
attribute in the diagram that implies them. The least upper bound, also called the join of the two 
attributes, is the unique attribute that (i) is implied by each of the two attributes and (ii) implies 
every other attribute in the diagram that is implied by each of them. The meet and join 
operations are customarily denoted by   and ∨, respectively. This notation is consistent with the 
use of   in Figure 2 and Figure 3 as the symbol for logical conjunction. An attribute that is 
defined as the conjunction of two other attributes is clearly their meet: it implies each of the 
two attributes and it is implied by any other attribute that does the same. Conversely, the meet 
of any two attributes must be equivalent to their conjunction, since by Theorem 2 an attribute 
equivalent to the latter appears in the diagram. 
A CSD, CED or MED in a Bayesian game usually has more than one of the attributes of 
distributions described in this paper. In particular, if it has a certain attribute, then it also 
possesses every other attribute that is implied by it. For example, every type correlated 
distribution (attribute V in Figure 1) has the conditional independence property (attribute IV). 
However, it follows as a corollary from Theorem 2 that, among all the attributes in Figure 1, 
Figure 2 or Figure 3 that a given CSD, CED or MED has, there is always one that implies all the 
others; it is the distribution’s strongest attribute. Clearly, specifying the strongest attribute is 
equivalent to specifying the whole collection of attributes that the distribution possesses. 
Corollary. For every correlated strategy distribution  , the collection of all the attributes in 
Figure 1 that   possesses includes one attribute that implies all the others. The same is true for 
correlated equilibrium distributions and for communication equilibrium distributions, except 
that for them the relevant attributes are those in Figure 2 and Figure 3, respectively. 
This result follows immediately from the closedness under conjunctions. By Theorem 2, the 
conjunction of all the attributes that a distribution   possesses is equivalent to one of the 
attributes in the relevant Hasse diagram. Since equivalence means two-way implication, it 
follows that (i)   has that attribute, and (ii) the attribute implies all the other attributes that   
possesses. Parenthetically, the Corollary does not simply follow from the observation that each 
of the three Hasse diagrams is a lattice (or vice versa). Removing IIIb, for example, from Figure 2 
would invalidate the corollary, but the Hasse diagram would still be a lattice.  
As an illustration of the Corollary, consider a CED with the conditional independence property 
that is not a pure-equilibrium distribution. Any mechanism that implements the CED must 
involve randomization. Otherwise, the CED’s strongest attribute would imply both  - and   ̃-
implementability but not      -implementability. However, no attribute in Figure 2 has these 
properties. 
Classification according to the strongest attribute partitions the collection of all CSDs into seven 
nonempty and mutually disjoint classes. The partition for CEDs, which is finer than (that 
inherited from) the former, has 14 or 15 elements, and for MEDs the number of classes is 15, 16  25 
 
Figure 4. Hasse diagram of the implication relations between attributes of outcomes in Bayesian games: correlated 
strategy distributions (CSDs), correlated equilibrium distributions (CEDs), and communication equilibrium 
distributions (MEDs). A box represents a pair of equivalent implication relations: for all subsets         and   of 
(the fundamental properties of mechanisms) {    ̃     ̃    }, one implication holds if and only if the other holds. 
An arrow represents only one-way implication (between implications): if the implication relations in the lower box 
hold, those in the higher box also hold. 
or 17 (and, as proved below, is strictly greater than the previous number). Each of these classes 
can be designated by the same roman number and, if applicable, subscript letter as the 
corresponding attribute in Figure 1, Figure 2 or Figure 3. For example, class IV of CSDs consists of 
all the correlated strategy distributions with the conditional independence property that are not 
type correlated distributions.  
8.1  Relations between solution concepts 
The three Hasse diagrams presented in the preceding sections refer to different notions of 
solution concepts or outcomes in Bayesian games. Specifically, they present the implication 
relation between attributes of correlated strategy distributions (Figure 1), between attributes of 
correlated equilibrium distributions (Figure 2), and between attributes of communication 
equilibrium distributions (Figure 3). However, since in all cases the attributes are defined in 
terms of fundamental properties of implementing mechanisms, the implication relations are 
themselves potentially comparable. Indeed, by Propositions 11 and 22 in the appendices, each 
of the three relations implies or is implied by each of the others. This implication relation 
between implication relations is shown by the Hasse diagram in Figure 4. It follows, in particular, 
from this diagram and the previous ones that the number of attributes of CEDs (which is either 
14 or 15, depending on the answer to the Open Question presented at the end of ‎ Appendix B) is 
strictly less than for MEDs. 
8.2  Payoffs 
In the context of correlated strategies, correlated equilibria or communication equilibria, an 
“outcome” may mean either the joint distribution of the players’ types and actions or, perhaps 
more naturally, the corresponding players’ payoffs. The analysis in the preceding sections is 
concerned with the former. However, as shown below, this analysis is also most relevant for the 
latter.  
The expected payoffs of the players in a Bayesian game are completely determined by the joint 
distribution of their types and actions. However, the relation between distributions and payoff 
vectors is normally many-to-one. Hence, if a particular correlated equilibrium distribution, for 
example, cannot be implemented by a mechanism of a particular kind, it does not necessarily 
follow that the corresponding payoff vector is not thus implementable; it may be that a 
mechanism of that kind implements another CED with the same payoffs. Games with constant 
payoff functions provide a trivial example of this. In such games, a CED is implementable if and 
only if it is implementable as a CSD, so that the connection between distributions and the 
properties of the implementing mechanisms is as detailed in Section ‎ 5. By contrast, the single 
possible payoff vector is of course implementable by any mechanism.  
A less trivial example is provided by Example 5. The original purpose of that example is to show 
that, in the two-player game considered, the joint distributions of type and action profiles 
achievable by type correlated equilibria are not identical to those achievable by strategy 
correlated equilibria. As shown, only the former include distributions for which the two types of 
 ?    ?       ⇒
CSD
? 
 ?    ?       ⇒
CED
? 
 ?    ?       ⇒
MED
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player 1 receive the different payoffs   and    . It is, however, not difficult to see that the 
expected payoff for player 1, which is (the mean)     , is achievable also in a strategy correlated 
equilibrium. Thus, the example seemingly does not go as far as Forges’ (1993) (considerably 
more involved) demonstration of the nonequivalence of type correlated and strategy correlated 
equilibria, which shows that even the players’ payoffs, which combine those of all their types, 
may be different for the two kinds of equilibria. However, it follows from the next theorem that 
to study the effect of the properties of the implementing mechanism on the correlated 
equilibrium payoffs (CEPs), which are the  -tuples                  specifying the players’ 
(expected) payoffs in the correlated equilibria in an  -player Bayesian game, it is not necessary 
to actually examine these payoffs, as Forges (1993, 2006) did. Solving the (seemingly easier) 
problem of CED implementability (Section ‎ 6) may suffice. This is because any two kinds of 
mechanisms (of those considered in Figure 2) that do not implement the same CEDs necessarily 
also do not implement the same CEPs. A similar relation exists between correlated strategy 
distributions (Section ‎ 5) and correlated strategy payoffs (CSPs), and between communication 
equilibrium distributions (Section ‎ 7) and communication equilibrium payoffs (MEPs). Moreover, 
the proof of the theorem, which is given in ‎ Appendix D, is constructive, and thus provides a 
means of automatically transforming an example such as Example 5 into one where type 
correlated equilibria and strategy correlated equilibria have different payoff vectors, rather than 
just different joint distributions of types and actions or different payoffs for player types.   
Theorem 3. For any two subsets   and   of the six fundamental properties of mechanisms, the 
proposition  
 -implementability implies  -implementability 
holds for correlated strategy payoffs, correlated equilibrium payoffs or communication 
equilibrium payoffs if and only if it holds for correlated strategy distributions, correlated 
equilibrium distributions or communication equilibrium distributions, respectively.  
Note that Theorem 3 does not mean that the Hasse diagrams in Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3 
also apply to CSPs, CEPs and MEPs, respectively. This is because one direction of the result (“if”) 
does not extend to the more general case in which the premise “ -implementability” is 
replaced by the conjunction “  -implementability and   -implementability and …”, for arbitrary 
list          of subsets of the fundamental properties.  
The last assertion is demonstrated by the simple game in which player 1 has two, equally 
probable types and only one action and player 2 has a single type and two actions. Player 2’s 
action only affects player 1’s payoff, which is   for one action and    for the other. A zero 
payoff for player 1 is implementable by a mechanism that reveals 1’s type to player 2, who then 
chooses one action or the other depending on the type, or alternatively by a simple coin toss. 
The former has property   and the latter has property  . However, a zero payoff is not 
implementable by any mechanism with both properties, since with such a mechanism, player 2’s 
action is necessarily always the same. Thus, unlike for correlated equilibrium distributions (see 
Figure 2, attribute VII), correlated equilibrium payoffs may not be    -implementable even if 
they are both  -implementable and  -implementable. 
8.3  A unified framework – an outline 
Correlated and communication equilibria may both be viewed as special cases of a model in 
which the messages that the mechanism sends to the players may depend on both their true 
and reported types. The dependence on the latter may be of little significance if there are no 
limitations on the mechanism’s use of the former. However, the present setup is constructed 
specifically for facilitating the analysis of such limitations and their significance. Suppose, for 
example, that only certain aggregate data concerning the players’ true types are available to the 
mechanism, e.g., a “checksum” of the types. The mechanism may then be able to detect 
unilateral deviations from truthful type reporting even if the profile of reported types lies inside 
the support of the common prior and is thus not a priori impossible, but may not be able to 
identify the player who lied about his type.  27 
The meaning of correlated strategy in the general setting outlined above is the same as in the 
two special cases: it consists of a mechanism and instructions for translating the mechanism’s 
messages into type-dependent actions for the players. A natural requirement, which generalizes 
both correlated and communication equilibrium, is that it is optimal for players to truthfully 
report their types and take the actions that are indicated by the messages they receive, if all the 
others do the same. The question that arises is: how do different limitations on the mechanism 
affect the outcomes of such generalized communication/correlated equilibria? From this 
perspective, the results reported in this work only concern two special kinds of limitations. In 
the first kind, the messages that the mechanism sends to the players are never affected by the 
reported types, and in the second, the true types do not affect the messages.  
Appendix A  Correlated Strategy Distributions 
For a subset   of the six fundamental properties of mechanisms (see Section ‎ 4.2), a correlated 
strategy distribution is  -implementable if there is some mechanism with all the properties in   
that implements it. If   and   are two subsets of properties,  -implementability implies  -
implementability if in every Bayesian game every  -implementable CSD is also  -
implementable. Shorthand for this relation is  
  ⇒    
A trivial sufficient condition for implication is reverse inclusion,      .  -implementability and 
 -implementability are comparable if the former implies the latter or vice versa, and equivalent 
if both implications hold. Shorthand for equivalence is  
      
The connection between properties of mechanisms and attributes of CSDs is extended by 
considering pairs of subsets of the fundamental properties. Each such pair,   and   , defines an 
attribute of CSDs , namely, the conjunction of  -implementability and   -implementability, 
which is denoted by  
        
A CSD has this attribute if it is implementable both by a mechanism with the properties in   and 
by a (generally different) mechanism with the properties in   .
24 Lemma 5 at the end of this 
section shows that such a CSD is always implementable by a mechanism that has both the 
properties in   and those in   . It follows that conjunctions actually do not give rise to new 
attributes of CSDs. 
If a particular implementing mechanism for a CSD does not have a certain fundamental 
property, it does not generally follow that the CSD lacks the corresponding attribute, for it still 
may be that some other implementing mechanism does have the property. An exception to this 
rule is presented by the following lemma. The lemma identifies several attributes of CSDs that 
can be determined by looking at a particular implementing mechanism, namely, the default one 
(see Section ‎ 4.2.1).  
Lemma 4. A CSD is   ̃-,  - or  - implementable if and only if its default mechanism has property 
  ̃,   or  , respectively.  
Proof. Consider a CSD   and its default mechanism  . By definition,   is equal to the joint 
distribution of the random type profile   and the default random action profile     . Let 
        be any correlated strategy other than the default one whose CSD is  , which means 
that   is equal to the joint distribution of   and the random action profile    defined by 
  
      
       
              
                                                            
24 The implication and other relations naturally extend to attributes that are defined by conjunction. The 
conjunction of three or more attributes is defined in the obvious way.  28 
The two equalities together imply that  
      
 
(   
       
     )
   
                
By property (5) of the default mechanism, for every       and   there is some    with 
       
               such that (2) holds, which by (15) implies that 
       
 
  
       
        
      
If    satisfies  , then the expression on the right-hand side has a degenerate distribution, which 
proves that   satisfies  . If    satisfies   ̃, then the distribution of the expression on the right-
hand side is unaffected by replacing    with any other type profile. The equality that results from 
this replacement proves that   also satisfies   ̃. If    satisfies  , then for every              
the entries on the right-hand side of the equality in (15) are independent, and therefore (3) 
holds. Since by property (6) of the default mechanism (3) holds also for             , this 
means that   satisfies  .  ∎ 
Unfortunately, Lemma 4 cannot be extended to all attributes of CSDs. In particular, as indicated 
at the end of Section ‎ 4.2.1, the default mechanism of an  -implementable CSD does not 
necessarily have property  .  
A.1  Intrinsic characterizations 
An intrinsic characterization of an attribute of CSDs presents an alternative to the attribute’s 
original definition in terms of properties of implementing mechanisms. This subsection presents 
the proofs of the three propositions in Section ‎ 5.1 and adds to them intrinsic characterization 
for the remaining two attribute in Figure 1.  
Proof of Proposition 1. To prove the sufficiency of the two conditions, consider a CSD  , with 
default mechanism   and default random action profile         . Suppose that (i) or (the 
stronger condition) (ii) holds. For every type profile              and action profile  ,  
         ∣                     ∣ ∣                              ∣ ∣        
                ∣ ∣                       ∣ ∣           
             ∣ ∣                     ∣ ∣                      ∣ ∣             
where the second equality follows from (i) (with      ), and the subsequent equalities follow 
from using an identical trick for the other entries of  . Again by (i), for every player  , type   , 
action   , and type profile    for which        
              , 
           ∣ ∣                        ∣            
                   
           
It follows from property (5) of the default mechanism that the equality between the left- and 
right-hand sides continues to hold even if        
              . This proves that, if (ii) holds, 
then   satisfies  . In addition, by (16), for             ,       and any       , 
         ∣                         ∏            
         
 
   
  
Assume, without loss of generality, that the indexing of the (finite) type space         
    
     of 
each player   (see Section ‎ 4.1) is such that         
    
      
             . Define a mechanism 
  ̅ by 
  ̅        (     
     
         
     
     )         
Thus, the message that each player   receives from   ̅ is a pure strategy of the form 
   
    
         
  , where the  th action   
  (         ) coincides with the message player   
would receive from the default mechanism   if his type were   
  and the other players’ types 
were given by    
  . Since this description does not involve in any way the actual, realized type 
profile, the mechanism   ̅ satisfies   and  . Clearly, it also satisfies   if   does the same, which, 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
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as shown, is the case if (ii) holds. Even if only (i) holds,   ̅ satisfies  . To prove this, it has to be 
shown that for any   
    
        ,   
    
        , … ,   
    
        , 
        
     
        
       
     
        
         
     
        
       
     
        
      
  ∏        
     
        
       
     
        
    
 
   
  
By (4), the right-hand is equal to  
∏∏        
     
        
  
 
 
   
 
and the left-hand side is equal to  
              
    
      
       ∏∏        
     
        
  
   
 
   
  
By the second equality in (17), used with            , the last expression is equal to (20). Thus, 
the mechanism   ̅ satisfies  . To prove that it implements the CSD  , define a corresponding 
correlated strategy    ̅   ̅  by  
  ̅    
     
    
          
                    
According to   ̅ , of all the entries in the message, player   takes the one corresponding to his 
actual type. It has to be shown that for every              and      ,  
         ∣       
       ̅       ̅              ̅       ̅                ̅       ̅            ∣ ∣         
By (17), used with        , this equality is equivalent to 
∏            
         
 
   
       ̅       ̅              ̅       ̅                ̅       ̅              
By property   of the mechanism   ̅, the right-hand side is equal to  
∏     ̅       ̅            
 
   
  
and by (18) and (21), the left-hand side is also equal to this product. Therefore, the above 
equality holds, which proves that   ̅ implements  . 
It remains to prove the necessity of the two conditions. For every CSD   there is a correlated 
strategy       such that   is the joint distribution of   and the random action profile   defined 
by (7). By that definition, 
           ∣                                                             
Therefore, if the mechanism   satisfies  , then the probability on the left-had side is either   or 
 , and if   satisfies   ̃, then  
             ∣                       ∣                                       
If   satisfies  , then for every      ,              and       
         ∣          ∏  (                  )
 
   
             ∣ ∣                    ∣ ∣         
These equalities and the one in (22) together give  
(19) 
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                   ∣ ∣                      ∣                   |        
             ∣ ∣                    ∣ ∣                   |        
             ∣ ∣                                 ∣ ∣            
This proves that if   is both  - and   ̃-implementable (and, a fortiori, if it is      -
implementable), then (ii) holds, and if   is   ̃- and  -implementable (and, a fortiori, if it is      -
implementable), then (i) holds.  ∎ 
Proof of Proposition 2. To prove the sufficiency of the condition, suppose that a measure   
satisfying (14) exists for a CSD  . Restrict   to its support  , and let the random variable   be the 
identity map on  . By construction,   is independent of the random type profile  . Define a 
mechanism   by 
                        
This mechanism clearly has properties   and  . The message space of each player is  , each 
element   of which is a pure-strategy profile    
    
      
    
        
    
     (where, for 
each   and  ,   
  is the action prescribed to player  ’s  th type). Define a correlated strategy 
      with this mechanism by  
     
         
                    
Strategy    simply instructs player   to take the action that his strategy prolife prescribes to his 
actual type. It has to be shown that the joint distribution of   and the random action profile   
corresponding to this correlated strategy is equal to  . By (14), this equality is equivalent to  
         ∣             { }                       
By (7) and (23), for any type profile        
     
       
    
         ∣                   
           
             
             
By (24) and the definition of  , the right-hand side is the  -measure of the set of all pure-
strategy profiles    
    
      
    
        
    
     such that    
     
       
       , which by 
definition is equal to    { } . Thus, (25) holds, so that   implements the CSD  . 
To prove the necessity of the condition, consider a CSD   that is equal to the joint distribution of 
a pair of random variables   and   such that (7) holds for some correlated strategy       with a 
mechanism that satisfies  . It has to be shows that there is a probability measure   such that 
(14), or equivalently (25), holds. Fix a type profile   . The random variable  
      
       
     
          
       
     
            
       
     
          
       
     
          
returns values in   
       
          
  , i.e., pure-strategy profiles. Its distribution   is given by  
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For every type profile        
     
       
               and action profile                , 
 ({   
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       })
          
        
      
               
        
      
                        ∣         
where the second equality uses (7) and the assumption that   has property  . Thus, (25) holds, 
as had to be shown.  ∎ 
Proof of Proposition 3. In view of Lemma 4, it suffices to show that the default mechanism   of 
a CSD   has property   ̃ if and only if the condition that defines the conditional independence 
property (Definition 3) holds for the default random action profile         . That condition can 
be presented as follows: for every player   and type    for that player and all type profiles    and 
(23) 
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    with        
           
               , 
           ∣            
                  ∣            
                
Since         , (26) is equivalent to 
         
     
 
         
      
It follows from property (5) of the default mechanism that (27) holds for all type profiles    and 
    with        
           
                if and only if it holds for all           . This is so for every 
player   and type    if and only if   has property   ̃.  ∎ 
Proposition 4. A CSD   is  -implementable if and only if the following holds for some 
(equivalently, every) random variable                  such that the joint distribution of   
and   is equal to  : 
(i)             are conditionally independent, given  .  
A CSD is  -implementable if and only if it satisfies the stronger condition in which (i) is replaced 
by: 
(ii)  The conditional distribution of   given   is degenerate. 
Proof. In view of Lemma 4, it suffices to show that the default mechanism   of   has property   
or   if and only if (i) or (ii), respectively, holds for the default random action profile         . 
In other words, the condition that      satisfies (3) or the condition that its distribution is 
degenerate holds for all type profiles   if and only if the condition holds for             . These 
equivalences are implied by properties (6) and (5), respectively, of the default mechanism.        ∎ 
A.2  Equivalences 
This subsection identifies a number of equivalent formulations for various attributes of CSDs. 
The first result establishes the irrelevance in the present context of the properties of 
mechanisms that concern the connections between the messages they send to a player and the 
player’s own type, namely, properties   and   ̃.  
Proposition 5. For CSDs, { }   {  ̃}   { }, {    ̃}   {  ̃   ̃}   {  ̃}, {   }   {  ̃  }   { }, 
{   }   {  ̃  }   { } and {   }   {  ̃  }   { }.  
Proof. Property   of mechanisms implies   ̃, and therefore { } ⇒ {  ̃} ⇒ { }. Hence, to prove that 
the three attributes are equivalent it suffices to show that every CSD is  -implementable.  
Consider the default mechanism   of a CSD  . That mechanism does not necessarily have 
property   (see Section ‎ 4.2.1). A mechanism   ⃗⃗⃗  that does have that property is defined by 
  ⃗⃗⃗        (     
            
        )         
This mechanism is similar to that defined in (18) in that the message that each player receives is 
a pure strategy, but differs from it in that the partial type profile on the right-hand side is     
rather than the constant one    
  . Therefore, the mechanism   ⃗⃗⃗  satisfies   but not  . To prove 
that it implements  , it only needs to be noted that the random action profile of the correlated 
strategy    ⃗⃗⃗    ̅ , with   ̅ defined by (21), coincides with the default one:  
  ̅       ⃗⃗⃗                       
The proofs that {    ̃}   {  ̃   ̃}   {  ̃}  {   }   {  ̃  }   { } and {   }   {  ̃  }   { } 
are very similar, and only require the following additions to the above proof.  
If the CSD   is   ̃-,  - or  -implementable, then by Lemma 4 the default mechanism   has 
property   ̃,   or  , respectively. It has to be shown that the mechanism   ⃗⃗⃗  also has the same 
property, in addition to  . When   satisfies   ̃, for every player   and type profiles    and     the 
equality (27) holds for all types   , which by (4) implies that 
(26) 
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Thus,   ⃗⃗⃗  has property   ̃. When   satisfies   or  , (4) implies that the random variables  
       
        
are independent or have degenerate distributions, respectively. It follows that the same is true, 
for every type profile  , for the   random variables 
   ⃗⃗⃗      
      
each of which is a vector whose entries are a subset of the random variables in (30), such that 
these   subsets are disjoint. Thus, the mechanism   ⃗⃗⃗  satisfies   or  , respectively.  
To prove that {   }   {  ̃  }   { }, it suffices to show that { } ⇒ {   }. This is shown in the 
proof of Proposition 2, where it is proved that the existence of a measure   as in that 
proposition, which is implied by  -implementability, in turn implies    -implementability.      ∎ 
Proposition 6. For CSDs, {     }   {  ̃    }   {    ̃  }   {  ̃   ̃  }   {   }   {  ̃  }  
({  ̃}   { }) and {     }   {  ̃    }   {    ̃  }   {  ̃   ̃  }   {   }   {  ̃  }  
({  ̃}   { }). 
Proof. It clearly suffices to show that ({  ̃}   { }) ⇒ {     } and ({  ̃}   { }) ⇒ {     }. As 
shown in the last part of the proof of Proposition 1, every CSD   that is both   ̃- and  -
implementable, or both   ̃- and  -implementable, is the joint distribution of   and some random 
variable   that satisfies condition (i) or (ii), respectively, in Proposition 1. Therefore, by that 
proposition, in the first case   is also      -implementable, and in the second, it is      -
implementable.   ∎ 
A.3  Implications 
Propositions 5 and 6 identify seven attributes of correlated strategy distributions that are 
defined (in several equivalent ways) by subsets of the six fundamental properties of 
mechanisms. Figure 1 shows these attributes as well as certain trivial implications between 
them, which all follow immediately from relations between properties of mechanisms. To prove 
that the figure presents a complete picture of the implication relations between attributes of 
CSDs, it remains to prove that implications additional to those shown do not hold, so that, in 
particular, none of the seven attributes is equivalent to another. For this, the following four 
propositions are required. 
Proposition 7. For CSDs, {     }   { }. 
Proof. It suffices to consider any complete information game (that is, a game where every player 
has only one type) with a mixed-strategy profile that is not pure.    ∎ 
Proposition 8. For CSDs, {   }   {  ̃}. 
Proof. In a two-player Bayesian game in which player 1 has a single type and two actions and 
player 2 has a single action and two types, consider a correlated strategy distribution in which 
player 1 takes his first or second action if player 2 is of the first or second type, respectively. This 
CSD is implementable by mechanism that simply tells player 1 the type of player 2, and thus 
satisfies   and  . However, the CSD is not   ̃-implementable, since a mechanism with property 
  ̃ cannot possibly provide player 1 with any information about player 2’s type.  ∎ 
Proposition 9. For CSDs, {  ̃}   { }.  
Proof. By Example 1, there exists a CSD that has the conditional independence property but is 
not  -implementable. By Proposition 3, that CSD is   ̃-implementable.  ∎ 
Proposition 10. For CSDs, {   }   { }. 
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Proof. In a complete information game, properties   and   automatically hold for every 
mechanism, but a CSD is  -implementable only if the players’ actions are independent.  ∎ 
Proposition 7 proves that attribute VI only implies the other attributes in Figure 1 that the 
diagram indicates it implies (in other words, it does not imply III or VII). Proposition 8 proves the 
same for attribute III. These two results prove that attribute II (which is implied by both III and 
VI) only implies attribute I, and therefore the latter does not imply IV. Proposition 9 proves that 
IV does not imply V. Proposition 10 proves that attribute V only implies the (two) attributes that 
the diagram indicates it implies, which establishes the same for attribute IV and for attribute I. 
Since, for mechanisms, property   implies   ̃, property   implies   ̃, and   implies  , there are 
only 27 relevant subsets of {    ̃     ̃    }, which all appear in Figure 1. Therefore, there are no 
additional attributes of CSDs that can be described by single subsets of the six fundamental 
properties of mechanisms. The following lemma shows that the same is true for pairs (hence 
also triplets, etc.) of sets of properties of mechanisms: no additional attributes of CSDs can be 
defined by them. This is because, if a CSD is implementable both by a mechanism with one set of 
properties and by a mechanism with a second set of properties, then it is implementable by a 
single mechanism that has all the properties of the other two. 
Lemma 5. For CSDs, for every two subsets       {    ̃     ̃    },  
                 
Proof (an outline). Proposition 6 proves the two cases of (31) in which     {  ̃} and   is { } 
or { }. By inspection of Figure 1, every other case follows from one of these two.  ∎ 
It is shown in Section ‎ B.3 below that for correlated equilibrium distributions a similar result to 
Lemma 5 does not hold. In other words, the requirement of incentive compatibility may 
invalidate the equivalence (31).  
Appendix B  Correlated Equilibrium Distributions 
The analysis of correlated strategy distributions in the previous appendix is a first step in the 
analysis of correlated equilibrium distributions. The former concerns qualitative differences 
between distributions that reflect the limitations of the implementing mechanisms. The latter 
also incorporates the constraints inherent in the incentive compatibility requirement. Whereas 
in the case of CSDs the limiting factor is the mechanism’s ability to transmit information to 
players (about the other players’ types and outside random events), in the case of CEDs its 
ability to do so selectively also comes into play.  
As for CSDs, each subset   of the six fundamental properties of mechanisms defines an 
attribute of correlated strategy distributions, namely,  -implementability. A CED has this 
attribute if there is some mechanism with all the properties in   that implements it. However, 
in the present context, implementability has a different meaning than for CSDs. Namely, the 
correlated strategy involved is required to be a correlated equilibrium. Thus, an expression like 
  ⇒   has a different meaning for CSDs and CEDs. Wherever confusion is possible, the generic 
implication sign may be replaced by the more explicit one  ⇒
CSD
 or  ⇒
CED
. As the following shows, 
the second relation is in a sense stronger than the first one. 
Proposition 11. For every two subsets       {    ̃     ̃    }, 
  ⇒
CED
   implies    ⇒
CSD
   
The same is moreover true with   replaced by by            , for any list         of subsets 
of {    ̃     ̃    }. 
Proof. It has to be shown that (i)   ⇒
CED
  and (ii)    
CSD
  are contradictory. Condition (i) means 
that, in every Bayesian game, every  -implementable CED is also  -implementable. Condition 
(ii) means that there is some CSD in some Bayesian game that is  - but not  -implementable. 
(31) 
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Without loss of generality, the payoff functions in that game (which are irrelevant for CSD 
implementability) are identically zero. However, this means that every correlated strategy in the 
game is a correlated equilibrium and vice versa, which contradicts (i). 
The same argument applies virtually unchanged also to the more general version in which   is 
replaced by            .  ∎ 
The converse of (32) does not generally hold. Consequently, not all attributes of CEDs that can 
be described in terms of the six fundamental properties of mechanisms correspond to attributes 
of CSDs. In other words, the former are not simply the restrictions of the latter to correlated 
equilibrium distributions. Rather, restriction is followed by refinement, which gives rise to 
additional attributes.  
Some of the attributes of CEDs, including the majority of those inherited from CSDs, are 
presented in the following subsection. The subsequent subsection describes additional 
attributes, by specifically identifying instances in which the converse of (32) does not hold. The 
last subsection completes the description of the implication relation  ⇒
CED
 (henceforth written 
simply as ⇒) by considering implications involving conjunctions of attributes of CEDs.  
B.1  Equivalences 
The following propositions identify equivalent formulations for several attributes of CEDs. 
Proposition 12. For CEDs, {    ̃}   {  ̃   ̃}   {  ̃}. 
Proof. In view of Lemma 4, it suffices to show that if the default mechanism   of a CED   has 
property   ̃, then the correlated strategy    ⃗⃗⃗    ̅  defined in the proof of Proposition 5 is a 
correlated equilibrium. As shown in that proof, if the default mechanism satisfies   ̃ (or   or  ), 
then   ⃗⃗⃗  satisfies both   and   ̃ (or   or  , respectively).  
By Lemma 3, the default random action profile          satisfies (11). By (29) and the 
definition of correlated equilibrium (Definition 1),    ⃗⃗⃗    ̅  is a correlated equilibrium if and only if  
                    
        ∣      ⃗⃗⃗                    
        
It follows that the latter condition holds if the conditional expectations in (11) and (33) are 
equal. The formal difference between the former and the latter is that player  ’s action   , 
which coincides with the message       he receives from the default mechanism, is replaced by 
  ⃗⃗⃗     , which by (28) also specifies the messages the player would receive if his type were 
different. Therefore, the meaning of the above equality is that these messages do not provide 
player   with any information that he could use for choosing a better action.  
Since         , if the conditional expectations in (11) and (33) are not equal, then by (28) there 
is some type of player  , say the first one   
 , and some messages   
    
    such that  
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The inequality implies that the pair of random variables   and     
       is not independent of 
     
            
        . However, if the default mechanism   has property   ̃, then it 
follows from (4) that such independence does in fact hold, so that the above inequality cannot 
hold, which proves that    ⃗⃗⃗    ̅  is a correlated equilibrium.  ∎ 
Proposition 13. For CEDs, {  ̃  }   { }. 
Proof. Let       be a correlated equilibrium with a mechanism that satisfies  . It has to be 
shown that there is some correlated equilibrium    ̂   ̂  with a mechanism that satisfies   ̃ and   
such that the two correlated equilibria have identical CEDs.  
The construction of    ̂   ̂  is based on the idea of encoding the messages that the mechanism 
  sends to the players in a particular manner. Suppose, without loss of generality, that these 
(33) 35 
messages are integers, more specifically, that the message space    of each player   consists of 
all integers between   and some number   . Since property   of the mechanism implies   ̃, the 
(random) message       that player   receives has a distribution function       that only 
depends on the player’s own type   . That is, for any    , 
                                            
The mechanism   ̂ combines the message       with a random variable   that is uniformly 
distributed on the half-open interval       and is independent of  . (The assumption of uniform 
distribution is actually inconsistent with the definition of random variable in footnote 4, which 
requires a finite probability space. However, this assumption is only temporary; it is removed in 
the last part of the proof.) Specifically, for every player   and type profile  , 
  ̂                                                  
It is not difficult to see that   ̂      is uniformly distributed on the unit interval. Therefore, the 
mechanism   ̂ satisfies   ̃ as well as  .  
The next step is to define a strategy   ̂  for each player   by   ̂       ̂                   ̂   , where 
   is a function that “decodes” the message   ̂      and recovers the original message      : 
                       ∣ ∣                 
By virtue of this decoding,   ̂  always specifies the same action as   . Since, in addition, the 
messages that the players receive from the mechanism   ̂ convey precisely the same 
information about the other players’ types and actions as those from  , this proves that    ̂   ̂ , 
like      , is a correlated equilibrium.  
The above construction does not strictly conforms to the definition of mechanism since the 
message spaces in   ̂ are infinite. This problem may be overcome by replacing the uniformly-
distributed random variable   with one that has only finitely many possible values, specifically, a 
random variable of the form     , where   is a real-valued function with a finite range. The first 
step is to consider the (finite) set  
               
       
 
of all values that may appear in the first term in (34). The next step is to modify the definition of 
the mechanism   ̂ by changing the message that it sends to each player   from   ̂      (which is 
defined by (34)) to     ̂      , where                 is the non-decreasing left continuous 
function defined by            {       ∣        } . This change is inconsequential. Since 
always   ̂            ̂                     , applying the decoder    to the modified message 
    ̂       still recovers      . Let the function                 be defined by  
          {          
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣                                        
                                        
for all        
}  
It is not difficult to see that the function   is well defined and, as required, has only finitely many 
possible values. The final step is to replace   in (34) with     . By definition of  , this 
replacement does not change the message     ̂      .  ∎ 
Proposition 14. For CEDs, {   }   {  ̃  } and {   }   {  ̃  }.  
Proof. To prove that {  ̃  } ⇒ {   }, it has to be shown that every CED implementable by a 
mechanism   with properties   ̃ and   is also implementable by a mechanism with properties   
and  .  
Property   ̃ of   means that for every type profile   and player   the distribution of       does 
not change when only player  ’s type    changes. In other words, the distribution only depends 
on   and on the partial type profile    . Therefore, it is possible to construct a family         
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of independent random variables, indexed by the players and partial type profiles, such that 
each entry        has the distribution described above. Define a mechanism   ̃ by 
  ̃                                        
Thus, 
  ̃       
 
                     
The mechanism   ̃ has properties   and   by construction. Since   also has property  , it follows 
from (35) that  
  ̃     
 
             
It is not difficult to see that any correlated strategy of the form       is a correlated 
equilibrium if and only if this is so for    ̃   . Therefore, the two mechanisms implement 
precisely the same CEDs.  
An almost identical proof shows that {  ̃  } ⇒ {   }. The only required change it to assume 
that the mechanism   has properties   ̃ and  . This assumption implies that for every   the 
distribution of      is degenerate, which by (36) implies the same for   ̃   . Thus,   ̃ 
satisfies  .  ∎ 
Proposition 15. For CEDs, {     }   {  ̃    }   {    ̃  }   {  ̃   ̃  }   {   }   {  ̃  }  
({  ̃}   { }) and {     }   {  ̃    }   {    ̃  }   {  ̃   ̃  }   {   }   {  ̃  }  
({  ̃}   { }). 
Proof. In view of Lemma 4, it suffices to show that every CED   whose default mechanism   has 
property   ̃ and, in addition, property   or   is      - or      -implementable, respectively. It 
is shown by Proposition 6 that such a CED is indeed thus implementable as a CSD. The proof of 
that proposition refers to the proof of Proposition 1, where it is shown that the mechanism   ̅ 
defined by (18) has the required three properties, and the correlated strategy    ̅   ̅ , where   ̅ is 
defined in (21), has the distribution  . Therefore, it only remains to show that    ̅   ̅  is in fact a 
correlated equilibrium.  
As shown in proof of Proposition 12, the mechanism   ⃗⃗⃗  defined by (28) satisfies   ̃ and  , and the 
correlated strategy    ⃗⃗⃗    ̅  is a correlated equilibrium. Therefore, it suffices to prove that  
  ̅     
 
  ⃗⃗⃗             
Since both mechanisms satisfy   and   ̃, (37) is equivalent to  
  ̅         
     
 
  ⃗⃗⃗         
                     
This condition holds by definition of the two mechanisms.  ∎ 
B.2  Implications  
By Proposition 11, an implication relation that does not hold for CSDs also does not hold for 
CEDs. Therefore, an immediate corollary of Propositions 7, 8, 9 and 10 is the following result. 
Proposition 16. For CEDs, {     }   { }, {   }   {  ̃}, {  ̃}   { } and {   }   { }.  
The next three propositions identify implication relations that do hold for CSDs but do not hold 
for CEDs. 
Proposition 17. For CEDs, { }   {  ̃}.  
Proof. This is demonstrated by Example 2.  ∎ 
Proposition 18. For CEDs, {  ̃}   { }.  
Proof. This is demonstrated by Example 3.  ∎ 
(35) 
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Proposition 19. For CEDs, {  ̃  }   {   }. 
Proof. This is demonstrated by Example 5.  ∎  
Propositions 12, 13, 14 and 15 identify six attributes of correlated equilibrium distributions that 
are defined by subsets of the fundamental properties of mechanisms. These attributes plus  -
implementability are shown in Figure 2 as attributes Ia, IIa, IIIa, IV, V, VI and VII. The implication 
relations that are specified by the Hasse diagram among these attributes all hold trivially since 
they follow immediately from relations between properties of mechanisms. It follows from 
Proposition 16 that additional implications among the seven attributes do not hold, and in 
particular, none of them is equivalent to any of the others. (The more detailed argument given 
in Section ‎ A.3 also applies here, mutatis mutandis.) Three more attributes are defined by { }, {  ̃} 
and { } (I, Ib and III in Figure 2). The implication relations shown in Figure 2 among these 
attributes and between them and the other seven all hold trivially. It follows from Propositions 
17 and 18, and from {     }   { } in Proposition 16, that additional such implications do not 
hold. Two more attributes are defined by { } and {   } (II and Va). It follows from Proposition 
19, and from {   }   { } in Proposition 16, that the implication relations shown in Figure 2 
between each of these attributes and each of the other ten are the only ones holding. This 
proves that there are precisely twelve distinct attributes of CEDs that can be defined by single 
subsets of the fundamental properties.  
Theorem 1 in Section ‎ 6.1 can now be proved. It follows immediately from it that attributes I, II, 
III, IV, V, VI and VII of CEDs are obtained from the similarly numbered attributes of CSDs by 
restriction. That is, a CED has any of these attributes if and only if it has the corresponding 
attribute as a CSD.  
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose first that     {  ̃    }, and let   be a CED that is  -implementable 
as a CSD. By Lemma 4, the default mechanism of   has all the properties in  . By Lemma 3, the 
default correlated strategy is a correlated equilibrium. Therefore,   is  -implementable also as a 
CED. 
Next, consider the case     { }. Let   be a CED that is  -implementable as a CSD. By Lemma 3, 
the default correlated strategy       of   is a correlated equilibrium. However, as remarked, 
the default mechanism   may not satisfy  . On the other hand, by assumption,   is the CSD of 
some correlated strategy         with a mechanism that satisfies  , but that correlated 
strategy may not be a correlated equilibrium. Consider the mechanism   ̃ defined by  
  ̃          
       
                    
It clearly satisfies  . In addition, by (15),  
  ̃     
 
                    
These equalities imply that the correlated strategy obtained from the default one       by 
replacing   with a mechanism   ̃ is also a correlated equilibrium, with the same CED. This 
proves that   is  -implementable also as a CED. 
To complete the proof of the theorem it remains to note that, by Propositions 6 and 15, for both 
CSDs and CEDs,    -implementability is equivalent to   ̃  -implementability, and the same is 
true for    - and   ̃  -implementability.  ∎  
B.3  Conjunction of attributes 
The next step is to consider attributes of CEDs that are defined by pairs (or possibly triplets, etc.) 
of subsets of fundamental properties of mechanisms, that is, by conjunction of two (or more) of 
the twelve attributes identified in the previous subsection. Unlike for CSDs (see Lemma 5), 
genuinely new attributes can be defined this way. For example, it follows from the next example 
that the conjunction of  -implementability and  -implementability is a new attribute. 38 
Example 6 A correlated equilibrium distribution that is  - as well as  -implementable 
but not    -implementable 
In a two-player Bayesian game, player 1 has two types,   
  and   
 , and two actions,   and  . 
Player 2 has three types,   
 ,   
  and   
 , and only one action,  . All type profiles except    
    
   
may occur, and they have the same probability (   ). If player 1 plays  , the payoff to both 
players is    . If he plays  , the payoff vector is determined by the type profile according to the 
following table: 
    
          
           
 
  
 
  
 
               
                 
 
The lowest possible expected payoff for player 2 in this game is    . For this payoff to be 
reached, player 1 should play   if and only if the type profile is    
    
  . This is in fact a 
correlated equilibrium distribution, which is implementable by a mechanism that sends to 
player 1 the message   if the type profile is    
    
   and otherwise sends  . Acting according to 
the message is incentive compatible for player 1 since it always gives maximum payoff to type   
  
and gives   
  (who is always instructed to play  ( an expected payoff of  , which is greater than 
the     he would receive from playing  . An alternative implementing mechanism sends to 
player 1 the message   or   if player 2 has type   
  or   
  respectively, and sends either message 
with probability     if the type is   
 . The correlated strategy with this mechanism that instructs 
player 1 to follow the mechanism’s instructions if his type is   
  but play   if the type is   
  is a 
correlated equilibrium. This is because the message that type   
  of player 1 receives never 
changes the probability he assigns to player 2’s type being   
 , which remains     regardless of 
the received message.  
There is no implementing mechanism that, like the first mechanism above, does not randomize 
and, like the second mechanism, sends to player 1 a message that only depends on 2’s type, say 
  
 ,   
  or   
  if the type is   
 ,   
  and   
 , respectively. To see this, note that since the action 
that the given correlated equilibrium distribution specifies for type   
  of player 1 depends on 
whether 2’s type is   
  or   
 , the message   
  must be different from   
 . Therefore, one of 
them, say   
 , must also be different from   
 . However, this means that the mechanism 
effectively tells player 1 whether or not 2’s type is   
 . It follows that, for player 1, choosing   
when the type profile is    
    
   is not incentive compatible:   would yield a higher payoff. 
Proposition 20. For CEDs,  { }   { }    {   } but  { }   { }    ({  ̃}   { }) ⇒ {   }.
25 
Proof. The first part of the proposition is proved by Example 6. To prove the second part, it 
suffices to show that ({  ̃}   { }) ⇒ {   }; the equivalence then follows immediately from the 
trivial implications {   } ⇒ { } ⇒ {  ̃}.  
Consider a CED   that is both   ̃- and  -implementable. It has to be shown that   is also    -
implementable. By the assumption of  -implementability and the second part of Proposition 4, 
there is a mapping                        such that   {        }       { }  for all type 
profiles  . By the assumption of   ̃-implementability, there is a correlated strategy       with a 
mechanism that satisfies   ̃ such that   is equal to the joint distribution of the random type 
profile   and the random action profile   defined by (7). In particular, for every             , 
                                                 ∣         
 ( (      ) )
   { } 
     
Therefore,  
                                  
Let the mechanism   ̃ be as in the proof of Proposition 14. By (35) and (38), 
                                                            
25 An argument broadly similar to that used in the proof of the proposition shows that  { }   { }  ⇒
{   } would hold if it were assumed that the type distribution    has full support (i.e.,             ), so 
that every type profile has positive probability. 
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         Player 2 
      Type         Type      
Player 1 
                     
Type        2  0  2/3     0  0  2/3 
   0  1  1/3     1  0  1/3 
    1/2  1/2      1/2  1/2   
                     
Type        0  0  1/3     0  0  1/2 
   0  0  2/3     0  0  1/2 
    1/2  1/2      1/2  1/2   
Table 2. A correlated equilibrium distribution for Example 7. The four type profiles are equally probable. For each 
of them, the actions that players 1 and 2 take are independent. The probabilities that these actions are   or   are 
given at the margins of the corresponding box. The numbers inside the box are player 1’s payoffs. The payoff of 
player 2 is always  .  
        ̃                       
Therefore, using the mechanism   ̃ instead of   gives a correlated strategy    ̃    whose CSD is 
also  . Moreover, if   ̃ is used and a single player   changes his strategy from    to some other 
strategy   
 , the player’s expected payoff changes to  (        
       ̃               ). By (35), 
this new payoff is equal to  
 (        
                    )  
which by (38) is also  ’s expected payoff if he unilaterally changes his strategy from    to   
  in 
the correlated strategy       (rather than    ̃   ). Since the latter is a correlated equilibrium, 
 ’s change of strategy cannot increase his expected payoff. This proves that    ̃    is also a 
correlated equilibrium, with a mechanism that by construction satisfies   and  .   ∎ 
It follows from the next example that the conjunction of  -implementability and  -
implementability is also a new attribute of CEDs.  
Example 7 A correlated equilibrium distribution that is  - as well as  -implementable 
but not    -implementable 
The game structure and common prior are as in Examples 1, 2 and 3. The payoff matrices of 
player 1 – one for each type profile – are shown in Table 2. Player 2 receives a constant payoff of 
zero. A mechanism randomly chooses for each type profile an action for each player according 
to the (marginal) probabilities shown in Table 2 in such a way that these eight choices are 
independent. It then informs each player of the action that was chosen for him for the actual 
type profile. The players’ strategy of always taking the indicated action is a correlated 
equilibrium. This is because a change of action by player 1 may affect his payoff only if his type is 
   and, in addition, (i) player 2 has type    and he plays  , (ii) player 2 has type    and he 
plays  , or (iii) player 2 has type    and he plays  . The effect in case (i) has the opposite sign 
and twice the magnitude of that in the other two cases. Since (i), (ii) and (iii) always have equal 
conditional probabilities, given that the type of player 1 is    and given his action, this relation 
between the effects means that the conditional expectation of the gain from changing action is 
always zero. Thus, the probabilities in Table 2 define a correlated equilibrium distribution, which 
the mechanism described above implements. By construction, the mechanism has property 
 .The same correlated strategy distribution is also implementable by the following mechanism, 
which has property  . The mechanism first chooses two pairs of actions,                and 
              , independently of one another. The probability that the pair    equals      , 
     ,       or       is    ,    ,     and    , respectively, and for    the corresponding 
probabilities are    ,    ,     and    . Then, for each type profile            , the mechanism 
chooses an action   
  for player 2 with probabilities (for   and  ) that depend on (both   and)    
(that was chosen in the first stage). Specifically, the probability that   
      is     unless 
            and, in addition, (i)           , in which case the probability is    , or (ii) 
          , in which case the probability is    . Finally, the mechanism sends messages to the 
players, which depend on the choices made in the first two stages as well as the players’ actual 
type profile            . The message to player 1 is    or    if 2’s type is    or   , 
respectively, and the message to player 2 is the pair of actions    
          
        . Thus, neither 40 
message is affected by the player’s own type. It is not very difficult to check that the correlated 
strategy with this mechanism that instructs each player to choose the first or second action in 
his message if his type is    or   , respectively, has the distribution in Table 2. For example, if 
           , the action profile is        
        , which is      ,      ,       or       with 
probability    ,    ,     and    , respectively. Thus, the players’ actions are independent and 
are distributed as specified at the margins of the top-left box in Table 2.  
To show that the above correlated strategy is a correlated equilibrium, it suffices to prove that, 
given that the type of player 1 is    and given the message he receives (which can be      , 
     ,       or      ), the conditional probabilities of the following three events are equal: (i) 
player 2 has type    and he plays  , (ii) player 2 has type    and he plays  , and (iii) player 2 
has type    and he plays  . As indicated above, such equality means that player 1 is indifferent 
between his two actions. The equality can be viewed as the conjunction of two equalities: (a) 
events (i) and (ii) have equal conditional probabilities, which are necessarily one-half the 
conditional probability that        , and (b) the latter is also equal to twice the conditional 
probability of (iii). To prove (a), it suffices to note that, given that            , the message    
that player 1 receives and the action   
        that player 2 takes are conditionally independent, 
and the probability that the latter is   is    . To prove (b), note, first, that by the specification of 
the mechanism and Bayes’ rule, the conditional probability that        , given that player 1’s 
type is    and that he receives the message      ,      ,       or      , is equal to    ,    , 
    or    , respectively. It is therefore sufficient to show that the conditional probability, given 
the same information, that         and   
            is    ,     ,     or    , respectively. 
This conditional probability is equal to the product of two terms: the condition probability that 
       , given that         and player 1’s message has the specified value, and the condition 
probability that   
           , given that             and    has that value. The first term is 
the complement of the conditional probability that        , and is hence    ,    ,     or     
if the message is      ,      ,       or      , respectively; and by the specification of the 
mechanism, the second term is    ,    ,     or    , respectively. Therefore, the product of 
the two terms is    ,     ,     or    , respectively, as had to be shown.   
There does not exist any implementing mechanism for the CED specified by Table 2 that has 
both properties   and  . Note that this is so despite the fact that, according to Table 2, for each 
type profile, the two players’ actions are independent. To see this, suppose that such a 
mechanism does exist. Consider a correlated equilibrium with that mechanism that has the 
above CED. Partition all the messages that player 1 may receive from the mechanism into four 
groups,      ,      ,       and      , according to the actions that player 1’s strategy 
prescribes to him when he receives the message and his type is    (first entry) or    (second 
entry). Since the mechanism satisfies  , and hence also   ̃, the probability of receiving a message 
that belongs to a particular group when player 2 has type    is the same for both types of 
player 1. Denote these probabilities by    
  ,    
  ,    
   and    
  . Let    
  ,    
  ,    
   and    
   be the 
corresponding probabilities for the case in which player 2’s type is   . Since for each type 
profile the probability that player 1 plays   is as specified by Table 2, the following equalities 
hold: 
   
       
   
 
 
      
       
   
 
 
   
   
       
   
 
 
      
       
   
 
 
    
By definition, in a correlated equilibrium, taking the prescribed action is always incentive 
compatible. In particular, type    of player 1 cannot increase the conditional expectation of his 
payoff when the message he receives belongs to group      ,      ,       or       by playing 
 ,  ,   or  , respectively (instead of the opposite action he is supposed to take). Since the 
mechanism satisfies  , for every type profile the message that player 1 receives is independent 
of player 2’s message, and hence of his action: player 2 always plays   with probability    . The 
above incentive compatibility condition is therefore expressed by the following four inequalities:  
(  ) 
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All inequalities must in fact hold as equalities. If any of the first two inequalities or any of the 
last two were strict, then      
       
          
       
        or     
       
          
       
        
would hold. These two inequalities are equivalent (since the probabilities in each quartet sum 
up to  ), and they contradict (  ). Therefore, in particular, the first and third equalities above 
hold as equalities, which implies that      
       
          
       
       . This equation 
contradicts (  ). The contradiction proves that no implementing mechanism for the CED 
specified in Table 2 has both property   (or even only   ̃) and  . 
Proposition 21. For CEDs,  { }   { }    {   }. 
Proof. This is demonstrated by Example 7.  ∎ 
Whether the conjunction of   ̃-implementability and  -implementability is also a new attribute of 
CEDs is not known. It depends on the answer to the following question. 
Open Question. For CEDs, does ({  ̃}   { }) ⇒ { }?  
This question corresponds to the question mark in Figure 2. The marked attribute is different 
from the one below it (attribute IIb) if and only if the answer is negative, that is, if there exists a 
CED in some Bayesian game that is both   ̃- and  -implementable but not  -implementable. If 
the answer is affirmative, the two attributes of CEDs are actually one and the same, that is, they 
are equivalent.  
Depending on the answer to the Open Question, there are two or three attributes of CEDs that 
can be defined as the conjunction of a pair of incomparable attributes of the twelve ones 
presented in Section ‎ B.2. Thus, there are in total 14 or 15 attributes of CEDs, which are related 
to one another as in Figure 2. The following lemma shows that this list is complete in that there 
are no additional, nonequivalent attributes that can be defined as the conjunction of two or 
more of those in Figure 2. This result holds regardless of the answer to the Open Question.  
Lemma 6. The conjunction of any number of the attributes of CEDs in Figure 2 is equivalent to 
one of the attributes in the same figure.  
Proof (an outline). It has to be shown that for every list           {    ̃     ̃    } the 
conjunction             is equivalent to one of the attributes in Figure 2. It suffices to consider 
lists with three or fewer entries, since in any longer list at least two elements represent 
comparable attributes. Proposition 15 proves the two cases of the conjunction of   ̃-
implementability and either  - or  -implementability. All the other cases follow quite easily 
from these two.   ∎  
Appendix C  Communication Equilibrium Distributions 
As for correlated strategy distributions and correlated equilibrium distributions, different kinds 
of mechanisms implement different kinds of communication equilibrium distributions. 
Specifically, for each subset   of the six fundamental properties of mechanisms, a MED is  -
implementable if it is the CSD of some communication equilibrium with a mechanism that has all 
the properties in  . This appendix, like the previous two, is mainly concerned with the 
implication relation between these attributes, and conjunctions of several attributes. 
Implication is denoted by the generic symbol ⇒ when it is clear from the context that it refers to 
attributes of MEDs. Otherwise, the more explicit symbol  ⇒
MED
 is used.  42 
The following proposition shows that a necessary condition for the last relation to hold is that a 
similar relation holds for CEDs. The propositions in Section ‎ C.1 prove that this condition is also 
sufficient, as long as only attributes that are defined by single sets of properties of mechanisms 
are involved. Thus, the reverse of implication (39) below holds too. However, this result does 
not extend to attributes that are defined by conjunction (compare Proposition 33 below with 
the second part of Proposition 20). Hence the differences between the Hasse diagram of the 
implications relations between attributes of MEDs (Figure 3) and the corresponding diagram for 
CEDs (Figure 2). 
Proposition 22. For every two subsets       {    ̃     ̃    }, 
  ⇒
MED
    implies    ⇒
CED
   
Moreover, the same is true with   replaced by by            , for any list         of subsets 
of {    ̃     ̃    }. 
The proof of Proposition 22, which is given at the end of this appendix, uses the results in the 
following two subsections. 
C.1  Equivalences 
The following propositions parallel those in Section ‎ B.1.   
Proposition 23. For MEDs, {    ̃}   {  ̃   ̃}   {  ̃}. 
Proof. It has to be shown that the MED   of any communication equilibrium        with a 
mechanism that has property   ̃ is     ̃-implementable. Unlike in the proof of Proposition 12, it 
cannot be assumed that the mechanism   is the default one. Nevertheless, without loss of 
generality, it may be assumed that it satisfies (4). Otherwise,   could be replaced by any 
mechanism   ̃ satisfying (4) such that 
  ̃     
 
             
These equalities mean that, for any profile of reported types  , the messages that   ̃ sends are 
indistinguishable from those of  . They implies that   ̃ also has property   ̃, and    ̃     is also a 
communication equilibrium. 
Consider the correlated strategy    ⃗⃗⃗    ̅  defined by (21) and the following generalization of (28): 
  ⃗⃗⃗        (     
       
             
       
         )               
Arguments similar to those used in the proof of Proposition 5 show that   ⃗⃗⃗  has properties   and 
  ̃. To prove that    ⃗⃗⃗    ̅  is a communication equilibrium, is has to be shown that, for every 
player  , type   
  for that player and strategy   ̅ 
         
       , 
                     ∣ ∣           
where   is the random action profile corresponding to   ̅, that is, 
       ̅        ⃗⃗⃗                               
and         
    
       
    is defined by  
  
      ̅ 
       ⃗⃗⃗     
            ̅ 
           
       
             
       
             
  
      ̅        ⃗⃗⃗     
                      
                
Suppose that, for example with       and   
      
 , (40) does not hold. This implies that there are 
some   
  and   
    
    such that  
          ∣ ∣        
                 ∣ ∣        
       
           
       
           
       
It follows from properties   ̃ and (4) of   that the pair of random variables   and     
       is 
independent of      
            
        . Therefore, the last inequality is equivalent to 
(39) 
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          ∣ ∣        
     
where   
               is the function defined by 
  
             ̅ 
           
           
    
        
    
        
However, in conjunction with (41), inequality (42) contradicts the assumption that        is a 
communication equilibrium, since it shows that when player 1’s type is   
 , he can gain from 
misreporting it as   
  and switching from    to   
 . The contradiction proves that (40) must in fact 
hold, so that    ⃗⃗⃗    ̅  is a communication equilibrium.  ∎   
Proposition 24. For MEDs, {  ̃  }   { }. 
Proof. Identical to the proof of Proposition 13.  ∎ 
Proposition 25. For MEDs, {   }   {  ̃  } and {   }   {  ̃  }. 
Proof. Identical to the proof of Proposition 14.  ∎ 
Proposition 26. For MEDs, {     }   {  ̃    }   {    ̃  }   {  ̃   ̃  }   {   }   {  ̃  }  
({  ̃}   { }) and {     }   {  ̃    }   {    ̃  }   {  ̃   ̃  }   {   }   {  ̃  }  
({  ̃}   { }). 
Proof. It suffices to show that ({  ̃}   { }) ⇒ {     } and similarly with   replaced by  . By 
Proposition 15, both implications hold of CEDs. The result that they also hold for MEDs follows 
immediately from the fact that an    -implementable CED is automatically a MED.   ∎ 
C.2  Implications  
Implication (39) in Proposition 22 can equivalently be expressed by its counterpositive: if an 
example of a  -implementable CED that is not  -implementable exists, then a similar 
counterexample can be found for MEDs. Finding the latter may or may not be easy. The former 
holds if the CED example employs a correlated equilibrium (with a mechanism with the 
properties in  ) that is also a communication equilibrium, that is, players have no incentive to 
lie about their types. In this case, the same example can be used for MEDs, since a CED that is 
not  -implementable a fortiori does not have that attribute as a MED. The proofs of the 
following two propositions use this simple observation. 
Proposition 27. For MEDs, {     }   { }, {   }   {  ̃}, {  ̃}   { } and {   }   { }.  
Proof. Proposition 16, which establishes the same for CEDs, relies on Proposition 11. Therefore, 
it suffices to show that a result similar to the latter holds with communication equilibrium 
(distribution) replacing correlated equilibrium (distribution). This can be shown by simply 
making this replacement throughout the proof of Proposition 11.  ∎  
Proposition 28. For MEDs, { }   {  ̃}.  
Proof. The correlated equilibrium with the mechanism with property   that is described in 
Example 2 is in fact a communication equilibrium. If player 1 lies about his type, player 2 gets as 
a message an incorrect type profile and will consequentially choose an action with which a 
positive payoff for 1 is impossible. For a similar reason, player 2 cannot gain from lying; in this 
case, the lie will only affect type    of player 2. The MED of this communication equilibrium in 
not   ̃-implementable since, as shown, it does not have that attribute even as a CED.  ∎ 
Even if the correlated equilibrium that is used for demonstrating that a certain implication does 
not hold for CEDs is not a communication equilibrium, not all hope is necessarily lost. It may be 
possible to make truthful type reports incentive compatible by augmenting the original game 
with a suitable auxiliary game and modifying the correlated strategy accordingly.  
Suppose, for example, that each of the two players in a Bayesian game can have type    or   , 
and all four type profiles are equally probable. The game can then be modified by adding to it an 
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auxiliary game that requires each player to push one of three buttons,   ,    or   . Depending 
on both players’ choice of button and on their types, a very large number       is either added 
to or subtracted from their payoffs in the original game. Specifically, the change in payoffs (   
or   ) is determined according to the following table, where the rows and columns correspond 
to the choices of player 1 and 2, respectively, and          is the product of their types:  
                  
  
  
  
         
         
         
   
Thus, for both        and   , three cells in the table represent reward and six cells represent 
punishment. Any mechanism in the original game can be turned into a mechanism in the 
augmented game by appending to the message it sends to each player, which pertains to the 
original game, a recommendation of button in the auxiliary game. The recommendation is 
determined in the following way. The mechanism attempts to identify the “rewarding” cells by 
calculating the product of the players’ reported types. It then randomly selects one of these 
cells, each with probability    , and recommends its row and column to player 1 and 2, 
respectively. As detailed below, the feature of the mechanism that encourages truth telling is 
that misreporting will result in misidentification of the rewarding cells. Note that, for any pair of 
reported types, the recommendation to each player is equally likely to be   ,    or   . 
Therefore, the modified mechanism has property   ̃ or   ̃ if the original mechanism has the same 
property. It cannot, however, have any of the other four fundamental properties. (However, 
with a somewhat more complicated auxiliary game, it is possible to also retain property  .)  
To any correlated equilibrium in the original game, there corresponds a communication 
equilibrium in the augmented game. In that equilibrium, the mechanism appends 
recommendations as described above, and then each player pushes the recommended button 
and plays in the original game according to the original correlated equilibrium. To see that 
truthful type reports are incentive compatible, suppose that, for example, button    is 
recommended to type    of player 1. The player can infer from the recommendation that, if 
both players reported their types truthfully and they will follow the mechanism’s 
recommendations, player 2 will choose    or    if his type is    or   , respectively, and in both 
cases, the players will get the reward of  . However, if (only) he, player 1, misreported his type 
as   , then player 2’s choice of button will have the opposite relation with his type. 
Consequently, player 1 can get a reward rather than a penalty of   only by choosing    or    if 
2’s type is    or   , respectively. However, since the players’ types are independent, this 
means that player 1 cannot get more than zero in expectation. Hence, misreporting the type 
does not pay. 
Proposition 29. For MEDs, {  ̃}   { }.  
Proof. Consider the Bayesian game and the   ̃- but not  -implementable CED presented in 
Example 3. That CED is not a MED. However, a communication equilibrium with a mechanism 
that has property   ̃ can be obtained by modifying the game and the correlated equilibrium 
described in the original example by adding an auxiliary game as above. The corresponding MED 
is not  -implementable even as CED. It is not difficult to see that, if it were  -implementable, the 
same would be true for the original CED.  ∎ 
The proofs of the next two propositions involve more special modifications of the original 
counterexamples, i.e., those pertaining to CEDs. 
Proposition 30. For MEDs, {  ̃  }   {   }. 
Proof. Consider the following modification of the game and CED in Example 5. Both players can 
have type    or   , and all four type profiles are equally probable. If the players’ types are 
different or identical, respectively, they both receive the payoff specified by the matrix  45 
       
 
 
(   
     
)        
       
 
 
(   
   
)    
The correlated strategy described in the original example is a correlated equilibrium also in the 
modified game. For a player of any type who receives the message   and takes that action, the 
expected payoff is                        , whereas playing   instead would only yield 
                                 . If the message is  , taking that action yields      , while 
playing   would yield  . This correlated equilibrium is moreover a communication equilibrium. If 
a player misreports his type, he will maximize his payoff by taking the recommended action, 
since this is also the action that the other player will take if the (real) types differ (and if the 
types are identical, then the expected payoff from any action is    ). Thus, a dishonest player 
cannot get more than                                    , which is less than the            
                     that a truthful report would yield him.  
It remains to show that the corresponding MED is different from the distribution of any 
communication (or even correlated) equilibrium       with a mechanism that has properties   
and  . The messages that   sends to the players can be written as        and       , for 
arbitrary type profile   . Since the players’ actions are identical if their types are identical, 
necessarily 
(                          )   (                          )  
If        is such that the left- (and, hence, also the right-) hand side equals       or      , 
respectively, then type    or    of player 1 will get         from taking the action   he is 
supposed to take but           from playing  . Therefore, the probability that the four actions in 
(43) are not all the same must be zero, which shows that the above MED, in which the players’ 
actions may differ, cannot be attained.  ∎ 
Proposition 31. For MEDs,  {   }   { }    {   }. 
Proof. Consider the following modification of the game and CED in Example 6. Unlike in the 
original example, player 2 has the constant payoff  , and he is allowed to choose action   as 
well as  . Choosing   rather than   reduces by   the payoff of type   
  of player 1 but has no 
effect on the other payoffs. The two mechanisms considered in the original example and the 
corresponding correlated equilibria are modified as follows. Both mechanisms instruct player 2 
to play   if player 1 reports the type   
  and to play   otherwise, and player 2 obeys. Clearly, this 
means that type   
  of player 1 has an incentive to report his type truthfully. The same is true for 
type   
 , for whom the CED gives the highest possible payoff.    ∎ 
An alternative proof for the last proposition can be obtained by using the following simple and 
generally applicable modification of the game and correlated equilibria in the original example. 
Instead of changing the players’ action spaces, a new player is added to the game. This “player 
 ” has a single type, and his action space is the collection   of all type profiles of the original 
players. If the action that player 0 chooses coincides with the other players’ actual type profile, 
everyone gets a huge bonus. Any correlated equilibrium in the original game can be modified as 
follows. The mechanism sends to player 0 the type reports of the other players, and he chooses 
the corresponding action. This obviously creates an incentive for the players to report their 
types truthfully, and thus turns the correlated equilibrium into a communication equilibrium (in 
the modified game). If property  ,   ̃,   or   holds for the original mechanism, the modified 
mechanism also has the same property. 
The following proposition uses this construction to show that if the answer to the Open 
Question presented in Section ‎ B.3 is negative, then the same is true for MEDs. Note that if the 
answer will turn out to be affirmative, the proposition is technically correct but uninformative, 
since its assertion holds vacuously.  
Proposition 32. If, for MEDs, ({  ̃}   { }) ⇒ { }, then the same is true for CEDs. 
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Proof. Suppose that, in some Bayesian game, there is CED   that is   ̃-implementable and  -
implementable but not  -implementable. It has to be shown that a MED with similar properties 
also exists. 
Consider two correlated equilibria whose CED is  , one with a mechanism that satisfies   ̃ and 
the other with a mechanism that satisfies  , and modify the game and the two correlated 
equilibria by adding a new player, player 0, as detailed above. The modification turns the two 
correlated equilibria into communication equilibria, whose common MED assigns nonzero 
probability only to pairs of type and action profiles in which the former coincides with the action 
of player  , and the probability in this case is equal to that assigned by   to the pair obtained by 
omitting player  ’s action. Any communication, or even just correlated, equilibrium whose 
distribution is this MED can be turned into a correlated equilibrium in the original game (in 
which   is a CED) simply by omitting the message to player   and that player’s strategy. If the 
mechanism in that equilibrium had property  , the same would be true after the omission. It 
therefore follows from the assumption concerning the CED   that a mechanism implementing 
the MED cannot in fact have property  .   ∎  
Proposition 32 precludes the possibility that the implication under consideration holds for MEDs 
but not for CEDs. However, it is mute about the opposite possibility. The following example, by 
contrast, considers a (different) implication for which the latter definitely holds, as comparison 
with the second part of Proposition 20 shows. 
Example 8 A communication equilibrium distribution that is  - as well as  -
implementable but not    -implementable 
In a three-player Bayesian game, each player has two types:   
  and   
  for player 1, and    and    
for players 2 and 3. All type profiles except    
         may occur, and they have the same 
probability (   ). Each player can choose to play   or  . Player 1’s payoff depends only on the 
type profile   and on the other players’ actions. Specifically, the payoff is   if        
        , and 
if an equality holds, it is given by the following symmetric matrix, where the rows and columns 
correspond to the actions of player 2 and 3:  
         
 
 
(     
    
)   
For players 2 and 3 the payoff is the sum of two numbers. The first number, which is the same 
for both players, is: (i)   if player 1 plays   and players 2 and 3 have identical types, (ii)   also if 
player 1 plays   and players 2 and 3 have different types, and (iii)   otherwise. The second 
number depends on whether the player’s own action is   or  . In the first case, it is equal to   
 , and in the second, it is given by the following table, in which the rows correspond to the 
player’s type and the columns correspond to the types of the other two players: 
    
       
       
       
    
  
  
                             
                           
   
Consider the mechanism with property   that, for each type profile  , instructs player 1 to play 
  or   if the (reported) types of players 2 and 3 are identical or different, respectively, and 
instructs players 2 and 3 to take the actions specified by the following table, in which the rows 
and columns correspond to the player’s own type and to that of the other player, respectively: 
       
  
  
   
   
   
This mechanism and the strategies of following the instructions together constitute a 
communication equilibrium. Player 1 cannot increase his payoff of   since there is no way he 
can make players 2 and 3 play   when they both have type   . And for these players, a truthful 
type report is incentive compatible, since if (only) one of them lies, they both lose the   they 
would get from a match between their types (either identical or different) and player 1’s action 
(  or  , respectively). In addition, for players 2 and 3, acting according to their strategy is 47 
incentive compatible. For a player of type   , doing so always guarantees maximum payoff, and 
for type   , playing   instead of the action   he is instructed to take would decrease the 
expected payoff by (               )    . 
The MED of the above communication equilibrium is also implementable by a mechanism with 
property  . That mechanism sends to player 1 the same messages as the mechanism described 
above, and sends to each of the other two players   (     ) a message that depends on the 
others’ types according to the table 
    
       
       
       
    
                                      
where         is a pair of (dependent) random variables that equals       with probability     
and       with probability    . A communication equilibrium with this mechanism that has the 
same MED as the previous one is defined as follows. The strategy of each player is to play 
according to the message he receives, unless he is of type   , in which case he plays  . For a 
player of type   , playing   would not increase the conditional expectation of the payoff, 
regardless of the message he receives. This is because, given that the received message is   or 
 , the conditional probability that the other players have types   
  and    is     or    , 
respectively. Since both         and         are greater than    , deviations to   are 
unprofitable. The incentive compatibility of truthful type reports is proved by arguments similar 
to those used for the previous equilibrium. 
There is no communication equilibrium with a mechanism with properties   and   that has the 
above MED. To see this, suppose that such a communication equilibrium exists. Since property   
implies   ̃, the distribution of the mechanism’s messages to player 3 only depends on the other 
players’ types, so that it can be described by the table  
    
       
       
       
    
                               
   
where   ,   ,   ,    are four probability measures on player  ’s message space   . If the type 
of player 3 is   , he is supposed to play   or   if he receives any message in          or in 
                   , respectively. Therefore, these two subsets of    must be disjoint. If the 
type of player 3 is   , he is supposed to play   regardless of the message    he receives. 
Deviation to   should not increase the conditional expectation of the player’s payoff, which 
means that  
(
 
 
   )   {  }   
 
 
   {  }   
 
 
   {  }   
 
 
   {  }       
Summing over all                          gives  
 
 
 
                             
 
 
 
 
 
     
It follows that if the type profile is    
        , the probability that player 3 plays   is at least    . 
The same is true for player 2. Therefore, by the assumed independence of the messages 
(property  ), the probability that both 2 and 3 play   when the type profile is    
         is at 
least     . Since                            , this means that player 1 has an incentive to 
misreport his type as   
  when it is really   
 , which contradicts the equilibrium assumption.  
Proposition 33. For MEDs,  { }   { }    {   }. 
Proof. This is demonstrated by Example 8.  ∎  
Propositions 23, 24, 25 and 26 identify six attributes of communication equilibrium distributions 
that are defined by subsets of the fundamental properties of mechanisms. Figure 3 shows these 
attributes, marked IIa, IIIa, IV, V, VI and VII, as well as eleven additional ones. The implication 
relations that are specified by the Hasse diagram among these 17 attributes all hold trivially, 
since they follow immediately from relations between properties of mechanisms. For two of the 48 
implications, it is not known whether the reverse implication also holds. The uncertainty is 
indicated in Figure 3 by a question mark. If the reverse implication does hold, then the marked 
box and the one below it should be coalesced, as they represent equivalent attributes. The 
following arguments show that none of the other attributes in Figure 3 are equivalent, and more 
generally, that the diagram shows all the implication relations between the attributes. 
If attributes that involve conjunctions were removed from Figure 2 and Figure 3, the two Hasse 
diagrams would become identical. In ‎ Appendix B it is shown that, among the remaining twelve 
attributes of CEDs, the implications shown in the diagram are the only ones holding. Essentially 
the same arguments prove the same for MEDs, except that Propositions 27, 28, 29 and 30 
replace 16, 17, 18 and 19, respectively. For each of the attributes in Figure 3 that does involve 
conjunction, it follows from Propositions 31 and 33 that the only other attributes that imply or 
are implied by it are those indicated as such by the Hasse diagram. This proves that the diagram 
is complete in terms of implication relations.  
Like the Hasse diagram for CEDs (Figure 2), that for MEDs (Figure 3) is complete also in that it is 
closed under conjunctions. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 6 except that is uses 
Proposition 26 instead of 15. Since it follows from Lemma 5 that closedness under conjunctions 
also holds for CSDs (Figure 1), this gives Theorem 2. Thus, for any given collection of attributes in 
one of the three Hasse diagrams, there is an attribute in the same diagram that that is 
equivalent to their conjunction. That attribute can easily be identified. Since it clearly implies 
each of the attributes and it is implied by every other attribute with the same property, it must 
be the meet, or greatest lower bound, of the given attributes (see Section ‎ 8). For example, 
Figure 3 shows that the conjunction of  -implentability and  -implementabiltiy is equivalent to 
     -implentability. In other words, the only MEDs with both attributes are the mixed-
equilibrium distributions.  
It is now possible to give the proof of the result presented at the beginning of this section, 
namely, that the implication relation between attributes of MEDs is in a sense stronger than 
that for CEDs. 
Proof of Proposition 22. As indicated, if attributes that involve conjunctions were removed from 
Figure 2 and Figure 3, they would become identical. This means that (39) as well as the reverse 
implication hold for all   and   that belong to the collection of 27 subsets shown in these 
diagrams, which clearly implies the same for all subsets of the six fundamental properties of 
mechanisms.  
To prove the more general implication in which   is replaced by        , it suffices to consider 
the case in which   - and   -implementability (of CEDs, or equivalently MEDs) are 
incomparable; the case in which they are comparable reduces to the version just analyzed. A 
straightforward examination shows that, with a single possible exception, for all    
{    ̃     ̃    }, if the meet of   -implementability and   -implementability implies  -
implementability in Figure 3, this is so also in Figure 2 (but not conversely). The possible 
exception is the case where         ̃ ,      { } and     { }, which is however covered by 
Proposition 32. This proves the generalization of (39) in which   is replaced by        . 
To prove the further generalization in which the list         has three or more elements it 
again suffices to consider the case in which no two elements describe comparable attributes. 
However, it is not difficult to check that this means that, in both diagrams,             is 
(equivalent to) attribute VII. Therefore, the version of (39) in which   is replaced by          
  holds trivially.  ∎ 
Appendix D  Correlated Strategy, Correlated Equilibrium and 
Communication Equilibrium Payoffs 
Correlated strategy payoffs (CSPs), correlated equilibrium payoffs (CEPs) and communication 
equilibrium payoffs (MEPs) in Bayesian games can be classified in a manner similar to the 
classification of CSDs (Figure 1), CEDs (Figure 2) and MEDs (Figure 3). Each subset   of the 49 
fundamental properties of mechanisms defines an attribute of CSPs, CEPs and MEPs, namely,  -
implementability. A payoff vector                       in a specified  -player Bayesian 
game is  -implementable if it coincides with the players’ (expected) payoffs in some correlated 
strategy, correlated equilibrium or communication equilibrium with a mechanism that has all 
the properties in   (equivalently, if   is obtained in some CSD, CED or MED, respectively, that is 
implementable by such a mechanism). For two subsets       {    ̃     ̃    },  -
implementability of CSPs implies  -implementability if in every Bayesian game every CSP that is 
implementable by some mechanism with the properties in   is also implementable by a 
mechanism with the properties in  . This relation is written as   ⇒
CS 
 . For CEPs and MEPs, the 
relations  ⇒
CE 
 and  ⇒
ME 
 are defined similarly.  
The main result concerning implementability of payoff vectors is Theorem 3 in Section ‎ 8.2, 
which asserts that the effects of the properties of the implementing mechanisms on the payoffs 
mirror the effects on the joint distributions of types and actions. Thus, there is similarity in this 
respect between these two possible notions of “outcome” in a Bayesian game.  
Proof of Theorem 3. The proofs for correlated equilibria and for communication equilibria are 
nearly identical. Only the former is presented below; the latter can be obtained from it 
essentially by replacing ‘correlated’ with ‘communication’ throughout. The proof for correlated 
strategies can also be easily obtained from the proof below by simplifying it in the obvious 
manner.  
It has to be shown that, for every       {    ̃     ̃    }, 
  ⇒
CE 
   if and only if    ⇒
CED
   
One direction of (44) (“if”) is easy.    
CE 
  and   ⇒
CED
  are contradictory, since the former 
means that, in some Bayesian game, there is a  -implementable CED   with a payoff vector that 
is different from that of every  -implementable CED in the same game, whereas the latter 
implies that   itself is  -implementable. 
To prove the nontrivial direction of (44) (“only if”), define the extension of a Bayesian game as 
the game obtained by the addition of dummy players — one for each element of      . 
A dummy player has only one possible type and one action, which are therefore insignificant in 
that they cannot affect the payoff of any player. In the following, the types and actions of the 
dummy players are ignored, and the collections of type profiles and action profiles in the 
extended game are thus identified with those in the original game, namely,   and  , 
respectively. The significance of the dummy players lies in their payoff functions. The payoff 
function                of the dummy player representing the types-actions pair            
  is defined as the indicator function  {     }. It returns   if the argument is equal to       and   
otherwise. Thus, the dummy players’ payoffs indicate the types and actions of the original, real 
players. In particular, for every correlated equilibrium distribution   and every element       of 
     , the expected payoff of the corresponding dummy player is equal to   {     } . It follows 
that two CEDs in the extended game,   and   ̃, give the same CEP if and only if they are equal, 
      ̃.  
Every mechanism in the original game can be extended in a natural way to a mechanism in the 
extended game by sending arbitrary constant messages to the dummy players. The original and 
the extended mechanisms have the exact same fundamental properties, and in the following, 
they are identified. Using this identification, every correlated strategy in the original game can 
be extended in a natural way to a correlated strategy with the same mechanism in the extended 
game by assigning to each of the dummy players his single possible strategy. Observe that:   
1.  the original correlated strategy has the same distribution as the extended one (recall the 
above comment regarding the identification of profiles in the original and the extended 
games), and  
2.  one of them is a correlated equilibrium if and only if this is so for the other.  
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Moreover, every CED in the extended game can be obtained in the above manner from some 
CED in the original game. The former may be the distribution of a correlated strategy with a 
mechanism that sends variable messages to some dummy players. However, these messages 
are inconsequential (since a dummy player has only one possible action) and hence can be 
replaced by constant messages. Such replacement preserves each of the fundamental 
properties. 
Suppose now that   ⇒
CE 
 . Then, for every  -implementable CED   in the extended game there 
is a  -implementable CED   ̃ in the same game with an identical payoff vector. As indicated, 
necessarily   ̃     , so that   is also  -implementable. It follows, by Observations 1 and 2 above, 
that every  -implementable CED in the original game is also  -implementable. This proves that 
  ⇒
CED
 .  ∎  
Note that the proof of the “only if” direction of (44) applies virtually unchanged also to the more 
general version in which   is replaced by            , for any list         of subsets of 
{    ̃     ̃    }. 
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